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Gabriel M. Ahlfeldt, Wolfgang Maennig & Felix J. Richter  
Urban renewal after the Berlin Wall:  
A place-based policy evaluation 
Abstract: We use a quasi-experimental research design to study the effects of a spatially targeted renewal 
policy implemented in Berlin, Germany, in the aftermath of the city’s division during the Cold War period. Our 
results suggest that over the course of 20 years the policy helped to reduce (increase) the propensity of build-
ings being in poor (good) condition within the targeted areas by, on average, 1.2–3% (0.6–2.5%) per year. 
The estimated effects on property prices range from 0.1–2% per year. In each case, the lower-bound estimate 
is not statistically significant. We find little evidence of positive housing externalities or positive welfare ef-
fects. 
Keywords:  Urban, renewal, revitalization, redevelopment, quasi-experiment, placed-based policy evaluation, 
real estate, Berlin  
Version:  January 2015 
JEL:  D62, H23, R21, R31  
1 Introduction 
Evidence-based policy-making, that is, the idea that public policies must be based on rigorous and 
objective evidence, has rapidly gained popularity in recent decades. This type of policy-making ob-
viously depends on the availability of careful empirical policy evaluations. The credibility of a policy 
evaluation, in turn, critically hinges on the inclusion of a valid counterfactual, i.e., the expected out-
come in the absence of a policy, to which the policy outcome can be compared. Truly experimental 
methodologies like randomized control trials, where randomly selected treated subjects can be fol-
lowed over time and compared to similar non-treated subjects, are not feasible in many fields of 
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policy evaluation. Researchers have responded to this limitation by applying quasi-experimental 
research designs to ex-post outcomes of existing policies which are, however, for good reasons typ-
ically implemented non-randomly. One policy area where the application of program evaluation 
techniques is severely complicated by the non-random nature of the analyzed policies is spatially 
targeted policies that aim at local economic growth. As place-based policies typically focus on areas 
that are deemed to be in need, according to some selection criteria, it is difficult to find comparison 
areas that are similar, but are not exposed to the policy in question. As a result it is often difficult to 
find compelling empirical evidence of the effects of place-based policies.1  
With this contribution we aim at providing evidence of a type of place-based policy where existing 
evidence is particularly scarce: urban renewal areas which are popular but empirically understud-
ied spatial planning instruments designed to prevent urban decline and induce renewal.2 Our ob-
jectives are twofold: Firstly, we aim at estimating the causal economic effect of a major renewal 
policy implemented in the aftermath of Berlin’s (German) unification. The first-order empirical 
question is whether the policy has sustainably increased the condition of buildings and the value of 
properties in the targeted areas. If so, the question that directly follows is whether there is an effect 
on the pure value of location – rather than the structures – because of a spatial externality so that 
the generated values exceed the public money spent. Secondly, we aim at informing the place-based 
policy evaluation literature more generally about the sensitivity of treatment estimates to distinct 
empirical design features that affect the counterfactual. We also provide a novel sensitivity analysis 
to evaluate how the validity of the estimated treatment effects depends on the number of subject 
and control areas included in the analysis. 
There are numerous sizable programs targeting neighborhoods in need around the world. In the 
US the Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) provides between $3 and $10 billion each 
year to cities and local administrations to improve conditions in low-income urban areas (Brooks 
and Phillips, 2007). Another example is the Home Investment Partnership (HOME) program, which 
supports affordable housing with approximately $2bn per year. In Germany, the budget for various 
urban development programs (“Städtebauförderung”), which are typically jointly financed by the 
                                                             
1  Kline & Moretti (2014b) provide an introduction to the general welfare economics of place-based policies 
along with a recent survey of the empirical literature. 
2  Saiz & Wachter (2011) provide a recent analysis of neighborhoods in decline. 
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federal government and the federal states, amounts to approximately €350 million ($453.1 million) 
to €500m ($647.3m) per year (Bundesinstitut für Bau, 2009).3  
To date there are only a few rigorous empirical evaluations of revitalization policies that aim spe-
cifically at the improvement of the quality of existing housing stock. Rossi-Hansberg et al. (2010) 
[hereafter RH] investigate property prices in and around four renewal areas4 and one control area, 
which was initially considered but ultimately excluded from the program in Richmond, Virginia. RH 
find a large effect on the prices of non-renovated properties, from which they infer the presence of 
a sizable positive housing externality and a return of $2 to $6 per dollar invested. Other results are 
more ambiguous (Santiago et al., 2001) or seem to suggest that such policies have a positive effect 
only if they are sufficiently large (Ding et al., 2000) or spatially concentrated (Galster et al., 2006).  
Berlin offers a unique institutional setting for an analysis of revitalization policies due to the 20th 
century history of the city. For several decades, the former capital of Germany suffered from either 
economic isolation (West Berlin) and loss of market access (Redding and Sturm, 2008) or transfor-
mation into a non-market economy (East Berlin), both of which severely affected the economy of 
the city. After reunification in 1990, the adverse economic performance was mirrored by a poor 
physical condition of the housing stock, especially in the eastern part (Senatsverwaltung für 
Stadtentwicklung Berlin, 1992, p. 16). In response to this situation, 22 renewal areas out of 39 orig-
inally proposed investigation areas (“Untersuchungsgebiete”) were designated between 1993 and 
1995 as target areas for a renewal program.5, By late 2010 (the period of the last official report on 
the renewal program), as much as €1.94 billion ($2.62 billion) had been spent on these areas. Our 
quasi-experimental research design compares property price trends within these 22 selected con-
servation areas over the period 1990 to 2012 to various counterfactuals. We consider the runner-
up areas not selected for the program as a control group for comparison but also make use of other 
control groups that are close to the treated areas either in spatial or socio-economic terms.  
We add to the aforementioned literature in a number of important respects. First, the program an-
alyzed is by several orders of magnitude larger than previously analyzed programs. This is true 
                                                             
3  Aggregate renewal financing data at the European level are not available. 
4  Throughout this article we refer to the term renewal area, however, the terms redevelopment or revitali-
zation area are often used interchangeably. 
5  The First Berlin Renewal Program (Erstes Gesamtberliner Stadterneuerungsprogramm). 
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both in terms of its ambitions and in terms of the public spending involved, thus making it a partic-
ularly interesting study case. Second, the relatively large number of 22 control areas (the areas con-
sidered, but not selected for the program) help to establish a counterfactual that is less sensitive to 
unobserved shocks in particular areas compared to a setting where only a few, or as in the case of 
RH, only one control area is available.6 Third, this large number of potential control areas also al-
lows us to evaluate the potential gains from being able to draw from a larger pool of control areas 
in the analysis of place-based policies more generally. Fourth, our data allow us to analyze not only 
the capitalization effects of property prices associated with the policy, but also the effect on the 
external condition of buildings in the targeted areas, the genuine focus of many renewal programs. 
Previewing our findings, our results indicate that the policy led to a significant upgrade of the hous-
ing stock. Property prices in the targeted areas tended to increase at an above-average rate, alt-
hough the evidence of a causal policy effect is somewhat weaker. Unlike RH, who find positive ef-
fects on non-renovated properties, we do not find strong evidence of the existence of housing ex-
ternalities, i.e., multiplier effects of the policy. Our sensitivity analysis suggests that our estimated 
place-based policy effects become sensitive to unobserved local shocks if we use a small number of 
subject or control areas, even though we cannot claim that this finding necessarily generalizes to 
other settings. 
In general terms we add to literature strands that have analyzed urban renewal processes (Ahlfeldt, 
2011; Clay, 1979; Noonan, 2014) and housing externalities (e.g. Autor et al., 2014; Ellen et al., 2001; 
Helms, 2012; Ioannides, 2002; Koster and Van Ommeren, 2013; Rossi-Hansberg et al., 2010; 
Schwartz et al., 2006). We also contribute to a literature that has assessed the impact of various 
local public policies via capitalization effects (e.g. Ahlfeldt and Kavetsos, 2014; Cellini et al., 2010; 
Dachis et al., 2012; Dehring et al., 2008; Eriksen and Rosenthal, 2010; Gibbons and Machin, 2005; 
Oates, 1969) and the economic effects of spatially targeted policies more generally (Baum-Snow 
and Marion, 2009; Boarnet and Bogart, 1996; Briant et al., 2015; Busso et al., 2013; Freedman, 2012, 
2014; Freedman and Owens, 2011; Gobillon et al., 2012; Ham et al., 2011; Kline, 2010; Kline and 
Moretti, 2013, 2014a; Murray, 1999; Neumark and Kolko, 2010; Sinai and Waldfogel, 2005).  
Our analysis further connects to a more general research strand in urban economics that examines 
the amenity value of cities (e.g. Albouy, 2009, 2012; Blomquist et al., 1988; Gabriel and Rosenthal, 
                                                             
6  Some of the 39 initial investigation areas were partially selected for the program, resulting in 22 self-con-
tained zones that were treated as well as a further 22 zones that remained untreated.  
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2004; Gyourko and Tracy, 1991; Tabuchi and Yoshida, 2000) or neighborhoods within cities (e.g. 
Brueckner et al., 1999; Carlino and Coulson, 2004; Cheshire and Sheppard, 1995; Ioannides, 2003).7 
This literature argues that there has been a re-orientation toward attractive central cities, espe-
cially among high-skilled young professionals, sometimes referred to as the creative class (Florida, 
2002). The consumption value of cities has therefore become increasingly important for the attrac-
tion of a highly skilled labor force and, hence, the economic success of cities (Carlino and Saiz, 2008; 
Glaeser et al., 2001). Our findings inform this literature on whether revitalization policies and other 
neighborhood polices such as historic preservation may contribute to the development of targeted 
neighborhoods and thus promote gentrification.8  
Finally, our results also complement the analysis by Ahlfeldt et al. (2015), who estimate a general 
equilibrium model of simultaneous household and firm location using the exogenous variation that 
stems from the rise and fall of the Berlin Wall. Our results provide further evidence that the funda-
mental reorientation to the pre-World War II equilibrium the city experienced after the fall of the 
Berlin Wall is unlikely to be explained by the renewal policies and is likely attributable to economic 
agglomeration and dispersion forces.  
2 Background 
After World War II, the building stock in Berlin was fairly degenerated. Especially in the eastern 
part, which was part of the former German Democratic Republic (GDR), many buildings had not or 
had only been insufficiently renovated prior to the unification due to tight budget constraints. Ad-
ditionally, private incentives to rebuild housing stock were low, as private real estate ownership 
was not encouraged in the GDR and rents had been frozen at a low level since 1945. These devel-
opments resulted in an overall poor condition of the building substance of original housing stock 
and inner city district centers, including massive vacancies and an increased need for renovation 
following unification in 1990.  
                                                             
7  This study complements research examining the effects of spatial density on the productivity of workers 
and firms (e.g. Ahlfeldt et al., 2015; Ciccone, 2002; Ciccone and Hall, 1996; Glaeser et al., 1992; Glaeser and 
Mare, 2001; Rauch, 1993; Rosenthal and Strange, 2001)  
8  Alternative determinants include transport affordability (LeRoy and Sonstelie, 1983), housing cycles 
(Brueckner and Rosenthal, 2009), housing demand shocks (Guerrieri et al., 2013) or natural amenities (Lee 
and Lin, 2012). 
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The main instrument to overcome these problems was the initiation of the First Berlin Renewal Pro-
gram in July 1992, which identified 39 investigation areas (Untersuchungsgebiete) as areas in need 
(Problemgebiete) (Senatsverwaltung für Stadtentwicklung Berlin, 1992). The boundaries of these 
investigation areas were drawn to encompass areas of urban decline and deprivation and did not 
necessarily coincide with higher-level administrative units such as postal codes, voting precincts or 
census wards. Not surprisingly, the vast majority of these areas were located in the eastern part of 
Berlin (Maennig, 2012).  
Because of funding constraints not all of the selected areas could eventually be designated. Qualita-
tive reports were commissioned for each of the 39 investigation areas, followed by public hearings 
where residents, landlords, and other groups had the right to express their views. Officially, there 
was no formalized selection process based on a ranking of the investigation areas according to dep-
rivation. Instead, the Senate of Berlin designated 22 renewal areas in 1993, 1994, and 1995 without 
further specifying the exact nature of the selection process. These areas purposely reflected the 
spatial distribution of the investigation areas. In some instances, renewal areas were split and only 
a fraction were designated to achieve this objective (Senatsverwaltung für Stadtentwicklung Berlin, 
1992, 1995a). Briefly summarized, the official documents suggest that selection among the candi-
date areas was random with respect to deprivation levels. Our analysis of the selection process, 
discussed in more detail in section 3.1 and the appendix (section 3.2), however, suggests that it is 
possible to predict whether or not an area would be designated based on a number of explanatory 
variables, a feature that we will exploit in our identification strategy.  
The 22 renewal areas covered an overall area of approximately 8.1 square kilometers, 5,723 plots, 
and approximately 81,500 dwelling units, with an average population of 5,000 residents per re-
newal area (Senatsverwaltung für Stadtentwicklung Berlin, 2001).9  The remaining parts of the 39 
investigation areas formed 22 self-contained areas, which in terms of location (see Figure 1) and 
observable characteristics (see Table 1) closely resemble the designated renewal areas.  
Within these renewal areas, private investments in the building stock were supported through tax 
reductions, loans, cash advances, and further financial support such as co-financing. After 2002 the 
focus was set on improvements in the social infrastructure and living quality of the neighborhoods. 
                                                             
9  In Richmond, the object of the RH (2012) analysis, the four targeted areas had an average population of 
1,900 residents and, on average, 1,000 housing units.  
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Private modernizations were no longer co-financed through public investments, but significant tax 
abatements remained as an implicit subsidy.10 
By late 2010, the expenses comprised about €1.94bn ($2.62bn) in public investments, amounting 
to approximately €880m ($1.19bn) for modernization and reinstatement, and approximately 
€645m ($873m) for expenses on infrastructure and social environment. The remaining disburse-
ments consist of preparation costs (€77m/$104m), allowances (€123m/$166m), other regulatory 
measures including compensations (€143m/$193m), and other building measures 
(€63m/$85m).11 The average expenses are approximately €88m ($119m) per renewal area, trans-
lating into per capita expenses of €17,500 ($23,700) distributed over a period of some 15 years.12 
This compares to per area payments of $3.5m and per capita expenses of $1,800 in Richmond over 
a period of four years. Currently, 19 of the 22 considered renewal areas have been released from 
their renewal status; Figure 1 in the data section shows the geographic locations of the renewal and 
investigation areas in Berlin.13 
3 Empirical strategy 
3.1 Baseline specification 
We use a combination of hedonic (Rosen, 1974) and difference-in-differences (DD) methods to es-
timate the causal effect of the renewal policy on the building condition and the sales prices of prop-
erty transactions in the targeted areas. We estimate time-varying treatment effects using the fol-
lowing empirical specification: 
𝑌𝑖𝑠𝑛𝑡 = 𝛼1𝑇𝑖 + 𝑓(𝑇𝑖 × 𝑉𝑠𝑡) + 𝛿(𝑇𝑖 × 𝐴𝑠𝑡) + 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝑏 + 𝐺𝑖𝑡𝑐𝑡 + 𝜑𝑡 + 𝜇𝑛 + 𝜀𝑖𝑠𝑛𝑡 (1) 
                                                             
10  Generally, modernization costs for own use or renting can be amortized completely over a runtime of 10 
to 12 years. For a detailed account of the regulations, compare § 154 and 177 in the building law code 
(BauGB) and § 7h, 10f, and 11a of the income tax law code (EStG). 
11 See Senatsverwaltung für Stadtentwicklung Berlin (2012), where the local administration provides de-
tailed budget accounting information for the different time periods. To the best of our knowledge, more 
up-to-date figures are not yet available. 
12 The total investment amounts to about 35% of the housing stock value. See section 2.3 in the technical 
appendix for further details. 
13 See Table A1 in the technical appendix for details on designation date, district, and expiration of the renewal 
areas. An overview of the area is shown in Figure 1; a snapshot providing more detailed graphical infor-
mation can be found in Figure A1 in the appendix. 
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, where i indexes a property, s indexes the nearest renewal area, n indexes the housing block a prop-
erty is located in and t indexes time. Yisnt is one of the following variables: a 0,1 indicator variable, 
which is one if a property i at time of transaction t is in poor exterior condition and zero otherwise; 
a 0,1 indicator variable, which is one if a property at time t is in good exterior condition and zero 
otherwise; the log of the price at which a property i is sold at time t;. The central elements of this 
specification are an indicator variable Ti, which denotes whether a property falls within one of the 
renewal areas we are investigating (T=1) or into the control area (T=0), and the function 
 𝑓(𝑇𝑖 × 𝑉𝑠𝑡), which captures the interaction effect of being located within one of the renewal areas 
and the number of years this area has been designated (Vst). We discuss the employed functional 
forms later in the text after providing a description of the control variables and control groups used.  
Control variables 
For a number of renewal areas, we observe transactions after their release from designation status 
(𝐴𝑠𝑡 = 1). We control for a potential capitalization effect, which might be related to the option value 
associated with the designation status via the interaction term 𝑇𝑖 × 𝐴𝑠𝑡 . We will not interpret this 
ancillary treatment effect 𝛿 because usually there are few observations after an area has been re-
leased from designation status. Xit is a vector of property and locational characteristics discussed in 
the data section and b is the vector of the respective implicit prices. We control for otherwise un-
observed time-invariant location characteristics via fixed effects 𝜇𝑛 defined for statistical block x 
investigation area x renewal area cells.14 Standard errors are clustered at the same level and, thus, 
accommodate a spatial structure in a relatively flexible manner. Macroeconomic factors that are 
assumed to be invariant across the treatment and control groups are captured by year fixed effects 
𝜑𝑡.  
To allow for time-variant implicit prices for some time-invariant location characteristics we add Git, 
which is a vector of locational characteristics interacted with year effects. ct is a matrix of year-
specific implicit prices. Unlike in real experiments, assignment to treatment and control groups is 
unlikely to be entirely random in a policy experiment, no matter how carefully treatment and con-
trol groups are matched to each other. If some of the attributes in which the treated and non-treated 
                                                             
14 A statistical block is the smallest geographic statistical unit in Berlin. There are close to 16,000 blocks in 
Berlin, of which around 6,000 cover undeveloped areas such as forests, parks, rivers or lakes. The average 
size of a statistical block is 0.05 square kilometers (0.02 square miles). 
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differ experience a change in valuation, this will affect the counterfactual. As an example, an auxil-
iary analysis reported in the appendix (section 3.6) reveals that over the course of our study period 
the premium of a property at the center of the city relative to a similar property 10km away in-
creased by approximately 30% from 2004 to 2012. Properties in East Berlin, on average, appreci-
ated by about 145% relative to properties in West Berlin since unification. These changes in the 
spatial structure of the city are a particular concern for our analysis because many designated re-
newal areas are located in central parts of former East Berlin. 
The problem can be remedied to some extent by allowing the effects of the respective attributes to 
vary over time. Therefore, we interact year effects with the distance from the central business dis-
trict, a kernel-smoothed density surface of bars, pubs, nightclubs, and hotels and a set of 23 city 
district dummies We note that all the variables we interact with the year effects are time-invariant 
to avoid problems of circular causation.  
Control groups 
We use several definitions of control groups to establish the counterfactual. Control group I in-
cludes all observations outside the urban renewal areas and a surrounding 500m buffer. In control 
group II, we impose a geographical limit by considering transactions that lie within a 500 to 2,000 
meter (approx. 6,000ft.) distance from the renewal areas. We exclude the 500m buffer area because 
of potential spillover effects. Recent evidence suggests that housing externalities and neighborhood 
externalities decline steeply in distance and typically lose most of their strength after a couple of 
hundred meters (Ahlfeldt et al., 2015; Rossi-Hansberg et al., 2010).  
Control group III consists of investigation areas that were not transformed into renewal areas – 
similar to RH. Officially, all investigation areas qualified for designation, but the available funding 
dried up after the designation of about half of the investigation areas, leading to a more or less 
random designation (Senatsverwaltung für Stadtentwicklung Berlin, 1995b, 1997). This claim is 
supported by similar observable characteristics of properties in the selected renewal areas and the 
remaining investigation areas (Figure 1 and Table 1). Yet, it seems possible that the selection was 
guided by a needs assessment at least implicitly. In a complementary approach, we therefore pro-
ceed under the assumption that there is a latent variable that summarizes the degree of area dep-
rivation and that limited funds resulted in a cut-off point beyond which no further designation was 
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viable.15 As a proxy for this latent variable we recover the predicted values from an auxiliary re-
gression of designation status on a range of investigation area characteristics. We find the threshold 
value in this variable that best predicts designation and argue that around this threshold the selec-
tion would be as good as random even if an implicit ranking by need existed. To restrict the identi-
fying variation to the fraction that is most plausibly exogenous we weight all observations accord-
ing to their distance from the threshold using a Gaussian kernel.16 This approach incorporates some 
elements of the Regression Discontinuity Design literature (Basten and Betz, 2013; Dell, 2010; 
Lalive, 2008) into our DD setting. A detailed discussion of the latent variable, the identified cut-off 
value, and the distribution of kernel weights is in the appendix (section 3.2).  
As a further alternative, control group IV is created based on the propensity score matching proce-
dure proposed by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983). In particular, we match transactions inside and 
outside renewal areas based on the propensity score; a likelihood of being selected for the treat-
ment based on observable characteristics. If transactions that are similar in observable character-
istics are also similar in unobservable characteristics, the resulting control groups will produce a 
valid counterfactual for the treated. In the estimation of the propensity score, we choose covariates 
that influence both participation in the treatment and the outcome variable. Only locational varia-
bles that are measured prior to the treatment or are time-invariant are considered (Caliendo and 
Kopeinig, 2008). These covariates include a range of internal property and external location char-
acteristics and are discussed in greater detail in the technical appendix (section 2.4), where we also 
present some descriptive statistics for the resulting sample.  
Treatment functions 
We define two versions of the time-varying treatment function 𝑓(𝑇𝑖 × 𝑉𝑠𝑡). The first is a relatively 
restrictive parametric variant. 
 
𝑓(𝑇𝑖 × 𝑉𝑠𝑡) = 𝛽0𝑇𝑖 × 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑖 × 𝑉𝑠𝑡 × 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑠𝑡 , (2) 
                                                             
15  An anonymous referee is acknowledged for pointing us in this direction. 
16  We weight transactions using the following area-specific weight : 𝑤𝑠 =
1
𝜆√2𝜋
exp (−
1
2
(
𝑆𝑠−?̅?
𝜆
)
2
), where 𝜆 is 
selected according to Silverman (1986). 
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, where 𝑉𝑠𝑡 is the number of years the nearest renewal area has been designated. It takes a value of 
zero in the year before designation, negative values prior to that, and positive values from the mo-
ment an area has been designated. POST is a 0,1 dummy variable denoting designation (𝑉𝑠𝑡 > 0). 
The year-specific treatment effects are defined as 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑉𝑠𝑡. By allowing for a level and a trend 
shift following designation this specification shares similarities with the baseline econometric spec-
ification in Galster et al. (2006). We prefer this specification to an alternative that would extrapolate 
a pre-trend to establish the counterfactual because our pre-periods (before designation) are rela-
tively short compared to the post-periods (after designation).17 
The second approach follows Ahlfeldt and Kavetsos (2014) and is more flexible. We group the 
treated observations into cohorts depending on Vst. For each cohort, we then define an indicator 
variable VDust describing whether transactions fall into the cohort, e.g., VD1st=1 for all observations 
transacted within one year after designation of the respective renewal area (𝑉𝑠𝑡 = 1), VD0st=1 for 
the year before designation, etc. Interacting all cohort indicator variables with the treatment indi-
cator T, we estimate a series of difference-in-differences treatment effects that compare how prices 
have changed since designation in the treatment and control groups: 
 
𝑓(𝑇𝑖 × 𝑉𝑠𝑡) = ∑ 𝛽𝑢(𝑇𝑖 × 𝑉𝐷𝑢𝑠𝑡)
𝑢≠0
 (3) 
The estimated ?̂?𝑢 coefficients hence form a mix-adjusted hedonic price index that flexibly reflects 
the evolution of the treatment group relative to the control group before and after the treatment.  
These two treatment functions have distinct strengths. The former allows for a straightforward as-
sessment of whether the policy had a significant impact on levels or trends based on only two coef-
ficients that can be estimated with relatively small standard errors. The latter approach produces a 
more flexible time-varying index, but larger confidence bands due to the relatively smaller number 
of observations per VDust cohort.  
Robustness checks and extension 
                                                             
17  This alternative specification would take the following form :  
𝑓(𝑇𝑖 × 𝑉𝑠𝑡) = 𝛽𝑃𝑇𝑖 × 𝑉𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽0𝑇𝑖 × 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑖 × 𝑉𝑠𝑡 × 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑠𝑡 . In robustness checks reported in the ap-
pendix we also use the following treatment function : 
 𝑓(𝑇𝑖 × 𝑉𝑠𝑡) = 𝛽𝑃𝑇𝑖 × 𝑉𝑠𝑡 × (1 − 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑠𝑡) + 𝛽0𝑇𝑖 × 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑖 × 𝑉𝑠𝑡 × 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑠𝑡 . In this model 𝛽𝑃  cap-
tures the trend in the treatment area relative to the control area before designation, which serves as a 
falsification test to evaluate the common trend assumption underlying the DD. 
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We subject our results to a battery of robustness tests. We consider different clustering levels for 
the standard errors as well as non-parametric heteroscedasticity-autocorrelation consistent stand-
ard errors (Conley, 1999), experiment with the sets of variables included in 𝐺𝑖𝑡, address concerns 
regarding the endogeneity of the amenity variable in 𝐺𝑖𝑡, discuss potential sample selection prob-
lems, analyze policy effects on transaction volumes and land values, test for pre-trends within the 
treated renewal areas as well as placebo treatment effects on the non-treated investigation areas, 
and experiment with various Gaussian or binary weights when using control group III. We also con-
duct several empirical exercises to detect potential housing externalities, i.e., increases in housing 
values due to the renovation of nearby buildings.  
3.2 Data  
Our study area comprises the area of the Federal State of Berlin, Germany. Within this study area, 
we observe all transactions of built-up land (including a structure) that took place between January 
1990 and August 2012, which amounts to approximately 70,000 transactions. The data set includes 
price, transaction date, location, and a set of parameters describing building/plot characteristics. 
The data were obtained from the Committee of Valuation Experts Berlin 2012 (Gutachterausschuss 
Berlin). The transactions are geo-referenced (addresses and x/y coordinates), which allows them 
to be integrated into a geographical information system (GIS) environment. The building charac-
teristics include floor space, plot area, surface area, age (we add an age-squared term), land use, 
location within a block of houses (e.g., a corner lot), among other variables. A special feature of our 
property data set is some explicit information on maintenance condition. The variables are coded 
by specialist teams of the Committee of Valuation Experts Berlin that undertake on-site examina-
tions for each transaction of built-up land that takes place. The building quality is recorded as either 
poor, good or average. We use this information to create a 0,1 indicator variable which indexes 
properties in poor and good exterior condition. 
Additionally, we merge a set of location variables generated in GIS. These include the distance of 
the transactions to the nearest public transport station, school, public park, lake or river, the central 
business district, the nearest listed building, and the nearest main street, and the street noise level. 
To control for time-varying implicit prices of proximity to consumption amenities, we generate a 
kernel-smoothed density surface based on the 2012 location of bars, coffee shops, restaurants, 
nightclubs, and hostels. We use a kernel radius of 2,000 meters and a quadratic kernel function 
(Silverman, 1986). The data are obtained from the open street map project, where users submit 
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data to generate a publicly accessible street map.18 While these data are user-generated and thus 
not official, they should provide a reasonable approximation of the actual distribution as long as the 
reporting probability does not vary systematically across space. The full list of considered variables 
is provided in Table A3 in the web-based appendix.  
From the Berlin Senate Department, we obtained maps showing the exact locations and boundaries 
of the 39 initial investigation areas as well as the fractions that were subsequently designated in 
three waves in 1993, 1994, and 1995. Of the originally proposed 39 investigation areas, 17 re-
mained entirely unconsidered in the eventual selection. From the remaining 22 areas a total of 69% 
of the land area entered the program. The fragmentation of some of the 39 initial investigation areas 
results in 22 self-contained zones that were treated as well as another 22 zones that remained un-
treated. We have digitally processed the maps and converted them to a shape file to merge the in-
formation with the other spatial data in GIS. The 22 renewal areas have a mean size of approxi-
mately 0.37 square kilometers (median 0.35). The investigation areas have an average area of 0.43 
square kilometers (median 0.36).  
Figure 1 shows the spatial distribution of the renewal/investigation areas along with our estimated 
smoothed kernel density surface and our matched control group (control group IV). Renewal areas 
and investigation areas are typically located in central areas and in amenity clusters in the eastern 
part of the city. Our matched control group (red dots) consists of transactions that are either close 
to renewal or investigation areas or are in areas of high amenity densities, which lends some confi-
dence to the selection process.  
Table 1 compares key characteristics across the renewal areas and the various control groups. We 
report differences in means between the treated group and each control group normalized by 
standard deviation of the treated group (standardized bias) in brackets. Clearly, transactions in in-
vestigation areas and matched transactions are more similar to transactions within renewal areas 
than an average transaction in Berlin.19 The housing stock is much older than in the rest of Berlin, 
and the floor space index, which measures the density of development, is higher. The reason is, in 
part, that single-family houses are rare in the centrally located renewal and investigation areas, 
while they are naturally abundant in the peripheral parts of the rest of the city. Renewal areas and 
the considered control areas are relatively homogeneous areas dominated by buildings constructed 
                                                             
18 Data are available at www.openstreetmap.org. 
19 Table A1 in the web-based appendix lists the renewal areas and some stylized facts per area. 
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around the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries (the so-called founding period/“Gründerzeit”). These 
are primarily apartment blocks, often with some commercial units on the ground floor. 
– Figure 1 about here – 
– Table 1 about here – 
4 Empirical results 
4.1 Policy effects on building condition 
We begin by analyzing the effect of the policy on the propensity that a transacted property is in poor 
physical condition. Table 2 presents parametric estimates of equation 1 by varying control groups 
using an indicator variable that takes a value of one if the external building condition is poor and 
zero otherwise (average or good condition) as the dependent variable. To keep the presentation 
compact, only the coefficients of primary interest are reported. In all models the short-run effect 
reflected by the coefficient on TxPOST (𝛽0) turns out to be small compared to the long-run effect 
implied by the coefficient on TxV (𝛽1) multiplied by 20 years. This is the expected result as it takes 
time for applications to be filed and renovation works to be completed. Column (1) results imply 
that compared to the rest of Berlin the propensity (on a 0,1 interval) of a building being in poor 
condition at the time of transaction in a renewal area changed by (𝛽0 =) − 0.030 + (𝛽1 =) − 0.02 ×
20 = −0.43. Normalization by the initial share of buildings in poor condition in renewal areas of 
52.11% results in a cumulated (percentage) effect after 20 years of −0.43/52.11% =  −82.37% or 
a compound annual growth rate of (1 + 82.37%)1/20 − 1 = −8.3%.  
– Table 2 about here – 
As we increase the strength of the counterfactual using spatially proximate properties (2), the in-
vestigation areas (3), the same with observations weighted by distance from the designation cut-
off (4), or the matched properties (5) as a control group, the cumulative effect drops significantly, 
but remains relatively large with at least -39.88% (5). Restricting the identifying variation to areas 
near the designation cut-off hardly affects the estimated effect, which is not in line with a selection 
problem. Combining our preferred control group, the investigation areas (group III) or the matched 
control group (group IV) with the time-varying effects (6 and 7) consistently results in substantially 
lower (approx. −21.5%) and insignificant estimated cumulative effects. One interpretation of this 
reduction in the treatment effect is that the renewal effect is to a significant extent driven by the 
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favorable location of renewal areas. In other words, to a large extent renovations would likely have 
happened even in the absence of the policy. Another interpretation is that the time-varying effects 
are absorbing some variation that is genuinely attributable to the policy. This would be the case if 
the increase in attractiveness of central amenity locations was the result of the policy instead of 
other factors.20 To this extent, the results in columns (6) and (7) represent lower-bound estimates 
of the policy impact and those in columns (3) and (5) indicate upper bounds. We view model (4) 
primarily as a means to evaluate whether the results in column (3) are driven by a selection prob-
lem. Throughout the paper we prefer to highlight the range of estimates across the models reported 
in columns (3–5) and (6–7) rather than an individual point estimate. Accordingly, we conclude that 
the policy effect on the propensity of a building being in poor condition is between an insignificant 
-1.2% and a significant -3% per year.  
– Table 3 about here – 
Table 3 replicates Table 2, replacing the dependent variable with a 0,1 dummy variable that takes 
the value of one if a transacted building is in good condition and zero otherwise (average or poor 
condition). The interpretation of all results is thus analogical to Table 2. We find smaller point esti-
mates throughout, but these need to be interpreted in light of the smaller share of the 17.79% of 
transacted buildings in good condition within renewal areas before designation. The increase in the 
cumulated effect in the weighted model (4) relative to the unweighted model (3) is, once again, not 
in line with an upward bias due to selection. The resulting cumulative percentage effects on the 
propensity of buildings being in good condition are in absolute and relative terms similar to the 
effects on the propensity of buildings being in poor condition, though pointing in the opposite di-
rection, as expected. The policy effect on the propensity of buildings being in good condition ranges 
between an insignificant 0.6% and a significant 2.5% per year.  
In Figure 2 we present the semi-non-parametric estimates of the temporal treatment function de-
fined in equation (3). The results are qualitatively and quantitatively in line with the parametric 
estimates and even the lower-bound estimates are statistically significant at least in a number of 
consecutive years. Importantly, the relative trends we find during the years after designation do 
not represent continuations of pre-existing trends. If anything, Figure 2 points to a trend reversion 
around the time when the policy started.  
                                                             
20  This problem is a variant of the “bad control problem“ (Angrist and Pischke, 2009). 
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– Figure 2 about here – 
Overall, we conclude that evidence of a positive policy effect on the quality of the building stock is 
relatively strong.  
4.2 Policy effects on property prices 
We now turn our attention to the extent to which the increase in the quality of the building stock 
capitalizes into the market value of properties in the renewal areas. To estimate the capitalization 
effect of the policy we once more estimate equation (1), now using the log of property transaction 
prices as the dependent variable. The presentation of results in Table 4 and the order of the models 
is analogous to tables 2 and 3. For the sake of brevity, we again focus on the treatment estimates of 
primary interest. The complete estimates of the structural and location parameters are in line with 
the typical findings in similar studies and are reported in Table A4 in the web-based appendix. 
Given the logarithmic scale of the variable the cumulated percentage renewal policy effect for any 
given year since designation can be computed as exp(𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑉𝑖𝑡) − 1.21 
Model (1) compares the evolution of property prices within the renewal areas to the rest of Berlin, 
our most general control group I. The results suggest that a positive long-run trend (approximately 
4.9% per year) dominates a negative intercept (-15%). After V=20 years, sales prices in designated 
renewal areas, on average, have since appreciated by as much as 120.4% relative to the rest of the 
city. This corresponds to an average yearly appreciation rate of approximately (1 + 120.4%)1/20 −
1 = 4.03%. As we increase the strength of the counterfactual using spatially proximate properties 
(2), the investigation areas (3), the same weighted by distance from the designation cut-off (4) or 
the matched properties (5) as a control group, the cumulative effect (average appreciation rate) 
drops to 95.25% (3.4%), 48.96%, 50.82 (2.08%), and 43.31% (1.82%), respectively. Weighting ar-
eas, once more, hardly affects the estimates.  
The inclusion of time-varying effects in models (6) and (7) has a strong impact on the estimated 
policy capitalization effect. The cumulative effect is reduced to an insignificant 1.08% (9.36%) in 
                                                             
21  We make use of the conventional interpretation of dummy variables in semi-log models (Halvorsen and 
Palmquist, 1980). 
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model 6 (7). Following the same logic as discussed in the previous section the annualized percent-
age policy effect on property prices ranges from an insignificant 0.1% to a significant 2% in our 
preferred models.  
– Table 4 about here – 
Figure 3 illustrates our semi-non-parametric estimates of the temporal treatment function defined 
in equation (3). We present estimates excluding (light dashed lines) and including (dark solid lines) 
time-varying effects using all properties outside the renewal areas (left graphs) and properties in 
investigation areas (right graphs) as a control group. The semi-non-parametric estimates are gen-
erally in line with the parametric counterparts presented in Table 4. The cumulative effect on all 
properties inside the renewal areas relative to those outside the renewal areas is slightly larger 
than implied by the parametric estimates (left), but declines to approximately 50% when the trend 
is benchmarked against the investigation areas (right). The positive trend effects seem to capitalize 
with some delay (beginning after five years). The negative level shifts found in Table 4 thus appear 
to be primarily driven by parametric constraints and should not necessarily be taken as indicative 
of a significant decline in prices immediately following designation. We note that the cumulative 
effect after 20 years in the models with time-varying effects is within the same range as model (6) 
in Table 4 and is not statistically significant. We find little evidence of the existence of relative trends 
prior to the intervention taking place. The (placebo) treatment effects for the initial year (u=-4) 
tend to be large and positive and again, if anything, imply a trend reversion. 
– Figure 3 about here – 
It seems important to note that the inclusion of time-varying effects has an even stronger effect on 
the estimated capitalization effects than on the estimated policy effects on the quality of the build-
ing stock, in particular in the models controlling for time-varying effects. The case for a positive 
capitalization effect is, therefore, arguably weaker. Furthermore, our range of capitalization effects, 
from an insignificant 0.1% to a significant 2%, is substantially lower than the 2% to 5% (both sig-
nificant) range reported by RH. Combining our estimated policy capitalization effects with the av-
erage property value and the number of properties in the renewal areas, back-of-the-envelope cal-
culations suggest that the total property value increased by €0.03–€1.37 for each Euro spent on the 
program. Notably, the lower bound is not only economically small, but is also based on an estimate 
effect that is statistically not distinguishable from zero (see the appendix, section 2.3 for details). 
This is, again, significantly lower than the 2–6 multiplier range reported by RH.  
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4.3 Robustness and extensions 
In this section we summarize the results of a number of alterations to the models reported here 
that are discussed in more detail in the appendix. First, we compute standard errors clustering on 
a wider neighborhood level and account for spatial autocorrelation, serial correlation, and hetero-
scedasticity, following Conley (1999) and using various cut-off distances (see appendix, section 
3.7). Second, we check parametrically that no significantly differing trends in house prices and 
building stock quality existed in the treatment and control areas prior to the policy being intro-
duced (see appendix, section 3.4). Third, we test for the possibility that the designation of renewal 
areas represented a negative signal to the remaining investigation areas, which could invalidate the 
counterfactual provided by control group 3 (see appendix, section 3.8). Fourth, we replace the con-
temporary amenity density with an analogically constructed variant that uses bars and restaurants 
as reported in the 1995/96 edition of the yellow pages (Gelbe Seiten), which should predate the 
impact of the designation of renewal areas (see appendix, section 3.9). Fifth, we experiment with 
Gaussian and binary kernels of varying bandwidths in the models using control group III (section 
3.2). The results support the interpretations and conclusions presented in this document. 
In a series of further alterations we replicate our preferred capitalization models, allowing for fewer 
time-varying controls, to address the concern that these absorb variation that is (partially) attribut-
able to the policy. We find that even with more conservative controls for correlated trends the es-
timated treatment effects frequently tend to be close to our lower-bound estimates, which further 
indicates that the policy’s impact on property prices was limited (see appendix, section 3.5). In a 
further set of auxiliary regressions we find that the number of transactions in relative terms tends 
to decline in renewal areas. The marginal quality of transacted properties in renewal areas might 
be increasing, implying a section effect that would increase the estimated policy effect and, once 
more, suggesting that the effects of the policy are likely moderate. In line with this interpretation 
we find lower treatment effects on assessed land values, which are supposed to be independent of 
structural housing quality (see appendix, section 3.3). 
We also conduct several empirical exercises to detect potential housing externalities, that is, in-
creases in housing values due to the renovation of nearby buildings. To separate the effect of the 
(subsidized) renovation of buildings on their own value from the effects of increased nearby reno-
vation activity within renewal areas we restrict the sample exclusively to buildings that were in 
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good condition at the time of transaction. Keeping the internal housing quality constant we inter-
pret the treatment effect as reflective of externality effects.22 Unlike in the baseline models we find 
cumulated treatment effects near to and not statistically distinguishable from zero when the com-
parison is made to the rest of Berlin or to the 0.5–2km buffer area. Using investigation areas and 
matched transactions as control groups we find somewhat larger, but qualitatively inconsistent and 
insignificant treatment effects (see Table A17 in the appendix).  
In an alternative approach we focus on spillover effects onto property prices in a 0–0.5 km buffer 
area around the renewal areas. Those areas were not exposed to the policy but would benefit from 
nearby improvements if housing externalities played a significant role. Using the naïve control 
groups comparing trends within the spillover areas to the rest of Berlin (excluding renewal areas) 
or the 0.5–2km buffer, the treatment effects are reduced by about two-thirds compared to the base-
line models. In the most demanding models, which use investigation areas or matched observations 
as control groups and control for time-varying effects, the treatment effects are insignificant and 
qualitatively inconsistent. The models using the same control groups, but excluding time-varying 
effects, stand out in the sense that they yield treatment estimates for the spillover areas that are 
very similar to the corresponding estimates for the renewal areas. This result runs counter to ex-
pectations in that even in the presence of housing externalities the typically relatively steep spatial 
decay in the externality (see Rossi-Hansberg et al., 2010) should imply a significantly smaller treat-
ment effect within spillover areas than within renewal areas. It seems therefore likely that our up-
per-bound treatment effects are at least partially driven by some heterogeneity in counterfactual 
trends that is not accounted for in the models excluding time-varying effects. This result further 
adds to the notion that our lower bound might be the more credible estimate of the policy effect 
(see Table A18 in the appendix).  
Overall, our additional robustness checks, using a different type of variation than in the baseline 
models, support the view that the evidence for housing externalities induced by the renewal pro-
gram is weak at best. 
                                                             
22  Compared to a restriction to buildings in poor (or normal) condition, our choice has the advantage that tax 
abatements or renovation subsidies are less likely capitalized into the sales prices of properties in good 
conditon since these are unlikely to be renovated in the near future. 
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5 Sensitivity analysis 
Compared to RH, the somewhat puzzling result of our analysis is that we find smaller effects of the 
policy on property prices and weaker evidence of housing externalities, despite analyzing a signifi-
cantly larger program. Naturally, the question arises as to which factors may account for the unex-
pected pattern of results. In terms of the institutional setting, it is notable that the share of owner-
occupancy in Berlin is very low, which may complicate coordination and reduce housing externali-
ties.23 In terms of the empirical setting, a notable difference is that in Berlin both the number of 
areas that were included (22 vs. 4) in the program and the number of areas that remained excluded 
(22 vs. 1) are significantly larger than in Richmond, reflecting the larger size of the program. Suc-
cessful identification in difference-in-differences analyses rests on the assumption that the treated 
and control areas are subject to the same macro-economic shocks. The relatively large number of 
treatment and control areas available in Berlin arguably helps with the identification because idio-
syncratic year-area specific shocks are more likely to cancel each other out within larger groups of 
treated or control areas.  
To evaluate the sensitivity of the identified treatment effect to the number of treated or control 
areas considered, we replicate our benchmark model using various combinations of 1, 2, 5, 10, 15, 
20, or all treatment or control areas. For each combination considered, we run 2,500 iterations with 
randomly selected areas (unless the total number of combinations is exhausted at a lower number, 
in which case we simply run all combinations). Assuming that the estimate in Table 4, column 3, 
reflects the true causal policy effect, the distribution of point estimates gives an indication of how 
likely it is that the policy evaluation would have yielded a biased result should fewer treatment or 
control areas have been available.  
Table 5 summarizes the distributions of the cumulated treatment effects by varying the number of 
randomly selected treatment and control areas. As expected, the means of the distributions of point 
estimates tend to be close to our baseline result of −0.04 + 0.022 × 20 = 0.40 log-points in Table 
4, column (3), especially in the experiments where we alter the number of control areas. The vari-
ation in point estimates is large, however. The standard deviation exceeds the mean of the point 
estimate if five or less treatment areas are sampled. Less than 40% of the point estimates fall within 
a two standard error length of our benchmark result. With only one control area sampled the point 
                                                             
23  In central city districts where most of the renewal areas are situated, the owner-occupancy share is fre-
quently below 10% (IBB, 2008).  
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estimates are within the same window in less than 15% of the cases. The variation decreases rap-
idly as the number of control areas increases. With five sampled control areas the standard devia-
tion is already less than half of the mean and the share of point estimates within two standard error 
lengths of the benchmark result increases to close to 60%. A similar pattern emerges if both treat-
ment and control areas are sampled at the same time.  
Figure 4 displays a selection of distributions summarized in Table 5. With only one randomly se-
lected treatment (control) area compared to all control (treatment) areas, there is little clustering 
of the point estimates, indicating a significant degree of area-specific shocks and/or heterogeneity 
for the policy effect across the treated areas (upper-left). With two randomly drawn treatment or 
control areas, the distribution of the probability of obtaining a point estimate near to the average 
treatment effect significantly increases even though only a small proportion of the estimates falls 
within two standard error lengths of the benchmark estimate (upper-right). With five or more 
treatment or control groups there is a relatively well-behaved probability distribution centered 
around the average treatment effect (middle panels).  
When treatment and control areas are randomly drawn simultaneously, the probability distribu-
tions start to exhibit a reasonable shape once at least five treatment and control areas are consid-
ered (bottom-left), although the results still show a remarkable degree of variation across the iter-
ations. The variation decreases substantially as the number of treatment and control areas is in-
creased. With 15 treatment and control areas, the mean of the point estimates is very close to the 
benchmark model (using all 22 treatment and 22 control areas).  
As we cannot draw large numbers of treatment and/or control areas independently it is not sur-
prising that the variation across point estimates generally declines in the number of areas consid-
ered. Yet, the degree of variability in the treatment estimates across the series where relatively few 
treatment or control areas are used is an interesting finding in its own right. It seems important to 
acknowledge that the inference of causal policy effects in similar settings is particularly challenging. 
We note that we find a very similar pattern of results when replicating the sensitivity analysis using 
the expanded model including time-varying effects (Table 4, column 6). The results are presented 
in the appendix (section 3.10). 
– Table 5 about here – 
– Figure 4 about here – 
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6 Conclusion 
Given the expectations that have motivated the renewal program in question and other similar pro-
grams, our results are simultaneously encouraging and disillusioning.  
On the positive side, our results indicate that the policy led to increased renovation work and im-
proved the maintenance condition of buildings in the target areas. In the course of 20 years the 
policy helped to reduce (increase) the propensity of buildings being in poor (good) condition within 
the targeted areas by on average 1.2–3% (0.6–2.5%) per year. This improvement in the stock of 
buildings has been accompanied by an increase in property prices in the range of 0.1–2% per year. 
In each case the lower bound is not statistically distinguishable from zero. Considering the full 
range of estimates, there is somewhat stronger evidence of a positive policy effect on building con-
dition than on property prices. 
On the negative side, our results do not point to the self-reinforcing effect operating through hous-
ing externalities for which one may have hoped. The increase in property value seems largely at-
tributable to the upgrade of internal quality. Back-of-the-envelope calculations suggest that total 
property value increased by €0.06–€1.35 for each Euro spent on the program. The lower bound is 
not only economically small but is also statistically not distinguishable from zero. While the policy 
seemed to have sped up the renovation of significant fractions of the urban fabric and, as such, 
helped to eliminate the visible traces of the division period, it has also primarily been a cash transfer 
to those landlords participating in the program. 
Our results look less favorable than those previously presented by RH, who find positive and large 
effects on property values in four renewal areas that exceed the investments by a factor of two to 
six and significant spillovers into adjacent areas. This is a surprising result given that the Berlin 
renewal program in terms of public investment was substantially larger than the Neighborhoods in 
Bloom program in Richmond, Virginia, analyzed by RH.  
There are some institutional factors that may account for the large discrepancy in the findings of 
Richmond and Berlin. For one thing, the Richmond program was based more on community volun-
teering and local non-profit organizations, while Berlin adopted a top-down approach implemented 
by official state authorities. For another thing, and perhaps more important, German cities, and es-
pecially Berlin, are not directly comparable to a US city like Richmond. In Berlin, much of the down-
town housing stock is owned by landlords and occupied by renters. Absentee landlords, however, 
are often argued to spend less on maintenance than owner-occupiers (Galster, 1983). Similarly, 
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owner-occupiers have been demonstrated to invest more in social capital (DiPasquale and Glaeser, 
1999; Hilber, 2010) and tend to use neighborhood policies as a framework to coordinate their be-
havior to internalize externalities (Holman and Ahlfeldt, 2014), as such, they may also be more re-
ceptive to renovation subsidies. A within-neighborhood contagion effect (Towe and Lawley, 2013) 
in renovation activity is, thus, less likely in Berlin. 
Another notable difference to RH is that, as collateral of the size of the program, we are able to 
establish a counterfactual based on a large number of areas which were initially considered but 
eventually not selected for the program. Due the smaller size of the Neighborhood in Bloom pro-
gram, RH rely on a singular neighborhood that was similarly considered but eventually not selected 
for treatment. The results of our sensitivity analysis indicate that some care is warranted when 
interpreting the results of quasi-experimental place-based policy evaluations based on small num-
bers of treatment or control areas.  
Overall, our results are in line with some previous analyses that have found moderate and ambigu-
ous effects of similar renewal policies (Ding et al., 2000; Santiago et al., 2001), suggesting that the 
very positive policy effect found by RH are likely specific to the case of Richmond, Virginia. We con-
clude that spatially targeted renewal area policies may well have a positive impact on the built en-
vironment, but it is not clear that they are necessarily welfare-enhancing.  
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Figures 
Fig. 1.  Study area 
 
Notes: Own illustration based on the urban and environmental information system (Senatsverwaltung für 
Stadtentwicklung Berlin, 2006). Crosshatched (hatched) areas indicate renewal (investigation) areas. Crosses 
are the matched transactions in control group IV. Smoothly shaded areas represent the consumption amenity 
density.  
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Fig. 2.  Renewal effect on propensity of transacted buildings being in poor or good condi-
tion 
 
Notes: Figure illustrates the renewal treatment effect 𝛽𝑢  as defined in equation 3. Estimates are based on equation 
(1), including (light dashed lines) or excluding (dark solid lines) time-varying treatment effects 𝐺𝑖𝑡 and using 
a 0,1 indicator variable denoting buildings in poor (left panel) or good (right panel) condition as the depend-
ent variable. The control group are the non-designated investigation areas in all models The parametric equiv-
alents are in Table 2, column 3 and 6 (left) and Table 3, column 3 and 6 (right). Error bars indicate the 95% 
confidence intervals. 
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Fig. 3.  Renewal effect on property transaction prices 
 
Notes: Figure illustrates the renewal treatment effect 𝛽𝑢  as defined in equation 3. Estimates are based on equation 
(1), including (light dashed lines) or excluding (dark solid lines) time-varying treatment effects 𝐺𝑖𝑡 and using 
the log of property price as the dependent variable. The parametric equivalents are in Table 4, column 1 (solid 
left), column 3 (solid right), and, column 6 (dashed-right). The parametric equivalent to the light dashed line 
in the left panel is not reported in Table 4 to save space. Error bars indicate the 95% confidence intervals. 
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Fig. 4.  Varying numbers of areas: Distribution of point estimates 
Separately varying number of treatment (black) & control areas (gray) 
1 random area selected (1 treated vs 22 control) 
 
2 random areas selected (2 treated vs 22 control) 
 
  
5 random areas selected (5 treated vs 22 control) 15 random areas selected (15 treated vs 22 control) 
  
Simultaneously varying number of treatment & control areas 
5 random areas selected (5 treated vs 5 control) 15 random areas selected (15 treated vs 15 control) 
  
Notes: Figure shows distributions of point estimates in series of estimations of the baseline model (Table, 4, column 
3) with randomly drawn treatment and/or control areas. In the upper two rows, black (gray) solid lines depict 
the kernel density of cumulated effects when varying the number of renewal (investigation) areas and com-
paring them to all investigation (treatment) areas. The black vertical lines depict the cumulated effect of our 
benchmark model (solid) plus/minus two standard error lengths (dashed). 
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Tables 
Tab. 1. Comparative statistics 
 Renewal ar-
eas 
Invest. areas Matched 
obs. 
0.5-2k m 
buffer 
Berlin (total) 
 (Treated) (Control 
group III) 
(Control 
group IV) 
(Control 
group II) 
All transac-
tions 
Price [€, CPI adjusted] 1,166,478.7 1,320,897.2 1,513,634.6 1,317,781.4 994,908.1 
 (1,614,568) (1,553,772.5) (3,959,344.1) (2,763,671.4) (2,711,511.8) 
  [-9.564] [-21.501] [-9.371] [10.626] 
Building age 100.8 95.29 92.57 84.98 63.19 
 (21.9) (25.77) (27.33) (32.58) (36.64) 
  [25.160] [37.580] [72.237] [171.735] 
Condition good [%] 10.3 8.24 11 13.6 21.8 
 (30.4) (27.5) (31.3) (34.3) (41.3) 
  [6.776] [-2.303] [-10.855] [-37.829] 
Condition bad [%] 42 28.2 34 25.4 14.7 
 (49.4) (45) (47.4) (43.5) (35.4) 
  [27.935] [16.194] [33.603] [55.263] 
Floor space index  2.664 2.707 2.063 2.153 1.214 
(floor space / lot size) (0.998) (1.238) (1.303) (1.341) (1.292) 
  [-4.309] [60.220] [51.202] [145.291] 
Lot size 863.7 919.4 1312.1 1077.9 1040.1 
 (923.8) (978.8) (2941.6) (2325.6) (2746.7) 
  [-6.029] [-48.539] [-23.187] [-19.095] 
Share of non-German  13.7 20.6 11.5 16.6 10.7 
population [%] (7.21) (15.1) (13.4) (15) (12.1) 
  [-95.700] [30.513] [-40.222] [41.609] 
Single family home [%] 0.387 3.16 2.17 16.2 46.5 
 (6.21) (17.5) (14.6) (36.8) (49.9) 
  [-44.654] [-28.712] [-254.638] [-742.560] 
Apartment building [%] 33.9 40.5 31.6 32.4 20.2 
 (47.3) (49.1) (46.5) (46.8) (40.2) 
  [-13.953] [4.863] [3.171] [28.964] 
Mixed use building [%] 59.1 48.7 43.8 39.8 20.4 
 (49.2) (50) (49.6) (49) (40.3) 
  [21.138] [31.098] [39.228] [78.659] 
Commercial use building 
[%] 2.81 1.76 5.94 3.32 1.65 
 (16.5) (13.2) (23.6) (17.9) (12.7) 
  [6.364] [-18.970] [-3.091] [7.030] 
Notes: Prices are in 2012 Euros. Standard deviations in parentheses. The percentage standardized bias [in brackets] 
is the difference between the means of the treated group and a control group normalized by the standard 
deviation of the treated group. 
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Tab. 2. Policy effects on propensity of buildings being in poor condition 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Control group 0.5 km - 
∞ buffer 
(I) 
0.5 - 2 km 
buffer 
(II) 
Investiga-
tion areas 
(III) 
Investiga-
tion areas 
(III) 
Matched 
observa-
tions (IV) 
Investiga-
tion areas  
(III) 
Matched 
observa-
tions (IV) 
T x POST  (𝛽0) -0.030 -0.017 0.006 -0.015 0.031 0.053 -0.025 
 (0.031) (0.032) (0.036) (0.049) (0.046) (0.050) (0.056) 
T x V (𝛽1) -0.020*** -0.016*** -0.012*** -0.011*** -0.012*** -0.008** -0.004 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
Cumulated effect after 20 years (%) -82.37*** -65.17*** -45.65*** -46.23*** -39.88*** -21.71 -21.36 
 (8.68) (9.07) (10.82) (14.57) (13.18) (14.18) (18.49) 
Compound annual growth rate (%) -8.31 -5.14 -3.00 -3.06 -2.51 -1.22 -1.19 
T (ever designated)_ YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
T x A (released from program) YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Hedonic controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Location controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Block x area fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Time-varying effects - - - - - YES YES 
Weighted - - - YES - - - 
Observations 64,677 17,447 7,841 7,841 8,860 7,841 8,860 
R2 0.420 0.368 0.300 0.278 0.362 0.351 0.417 
AIC 10986.0 12436.8 8002.9 8432.4 8468.6 7958.0 8216.3 
Notes: Dependent variable is a 0,1 dummy variable that is one if at the time of transaction a property was in poor 
physical condition and zero otherwise. Estimation method is (weighted) OLS. T is a 0,1 dummy variable de-
noting a property location within a renewal area. POST similarly denotes that the respective renewal area has 
been designated. A similarly denotes whether the nearest area has been released from the program. V is the 
number of years that have gone by since designation. The cumulated effect after 20 years is the combination 
of the short-run level shift and the long-run effect of the trend shift on the share of transacted buildings in 
bad condition normalized by the share before the policy was implemented (𝛽0 + 20 × 𝛽1)/𝑆
𝑃𝑅𝐸 , where 𝑆𝑃𝑅𝐸  
is the share of buildings in bad condition transacted in 1993 and earlier. Standard errors of the cumulated 
effect are similarly normalized by 𝑆𝑃𝑅𝐸 . Hedonic and location controls consist of covariates controlling for 
internal property and external location characteristics described in greater detail in the data section and the 
appendix. Block x area fixed effects are statistical block x renewal area x investigation area fixed effects. Time-
varying controls are sets of interaction effects of year effects and distance to the CBD, district effects , and a 
consumption amenity measure described in the data section. Weighted model is weighted by the distance 
from the designation cut-off along a latent deprivation variable (Gaussian kernel, bandwidth according to 
Silverman-rule). Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on block x area fixed effects in all models. * p < 
0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Tab. 3. Policy effect on propensity of buildings being in good condition 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Control group 0.5 km - 
∞ buffer 
(I) 
0.5 - 2 km 
buffer 
(II) 
Investiga-
tion areas 
(III) 
Investiga-
tion areas 
(III) 
Matched 
observa-
tions (IV) 
Investiga-
tion areas  
(III) 
Matched 
observa-
tions (IV) 
T x POST  (𝛽0) -0.004 -0.004 -0.030** -0.012 -0.036* -0.024 -0.022 
 (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.019) (0.019) (0.017) (0.019) 
T x V (𝛽1) 0.009*** 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.009*** 0.004* 0.002 0.003 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Cumulated effect after 20 years (%) 95.99*** 67.52*** 62.56*** 99.75*** 25.20 12.72 16.88 
 (16.36) (17.02) (18.30) (23.48) (22.28) (22.67) (27.37) 
Compound annual growth rate (%) 3.42 2.61 2.46 3.52 1.13 0.60 0.78 
T (ever designated)_ YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
T x A (released from program) YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Hedonic controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Location controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Block x area fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Time-varying effects - - - - - YES YES 
Weighted - - - YES - - - 
Observations 64,677 17,447 7,841 7,841 8,860 7,841 8,860 
R2 0.802 0.773 0.635 0.635 0.711 0.682 0.736 
AIC 79823.3 25239.9 11273.1 10895.7 13456.0 10744.4 13204.3 
Notes: Dependent variable is a 0,1 dummy variable that is one if at the time of transaction a property was in good 
physical condition and zero otherwise. Estimation method is (weighted) OLS. T is a 0,1 dummy variable de-
noting a property location within a renewal area. POST similarly denotes that the respective renewal area has 
been designated. A similarly denotes whether the nearest area has been released from the program. V is the 
number of years that have gone by since designation. The cumulated effect after 20 years is the combination 
of the short-run level shift and the long-run effect of the trend shift on the share of transacted buildings in 
bad condition normalized by the share before the policy was implemented (𝛽0 + 20 × 𝛽1)/𝑆
𝑃𝑅𝐸 , where 𝑆𝑃𝑅𝐸  
is the share of buildings in good condition transacted in 1993 and earlier. Standard errors of the cumulated 
effect are similarly normalized by 𝑆𝑃𝑅𝐸 . Hedonic and location controls consist of covariates controlling for 
internal property and external location characteristics described in greater detail in the data section and the 
appendix. Block x area fixed effects are statistical block x renewal area x investigation area fixed effects. Time-
varying controls are sets of interaction effects of year effects and distance to the CBD, district effects and a 
consumption amenity measure described in the data section. Weighted model is weighted by the distance 
from the designation cut-off along a latent deprivation variable (Gaussian kernel, bandwidth according to 
Silverman-rule). Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on block x area fixed effects in all models. * p < 
0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Tab. 4. Policy effects on property transaction prices 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Control group 0.5 km - 
∞ 
buffer(I) 
0.5 - 2 km 
buffer 
(II) 
Investiga-
tion areas 
(III) 
Investiga-
tion areas 
(III) 
Matched 
observa-
tions (IV) 
Investiga-
tion areas  
(III) 
Matched 
observa-
tions (IV) 
T x POST  (𝛽0) -0.162*** -0.114*** -0.040 -0.032 -0.140*** -0.073 -0.027 
 (0.036) (0.037) (0.040) (0.050) (0.053) (0.048) (0.061) 
T x V (𝛽1) 0.048*** 0.039*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.025*** 0.004 0.006 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
Cumulated effect after 20 years (%) 120.37*** 95.25*** 48.96*** 50.82*** 43.31*** 1.08 9.36 
 (6.64) (6.85) (7.90) (9.21) (9.81) (8.51) (11.15) 
Compound annual growth rate (%) 4.03 3.40 2.01 2.08 1.82 0.05 0.45 
T (ever designated) YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
T x A (released from program) YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Hedonic controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Location controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Block x area fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Time-varying effects - - - - - YES YES 
Weighted - - - YES - - - 
Observations 64,677 17,447 7,841 7,841 8,860 7,841 8,860 
R2 0.536 0.502 0.267 0.304 0.324 0.321 0.371 
AIC 23573.1 1236.1 491.7 459.8 972.3 448.1 881.1 
Notes: Dependent variable is log of property price in all models. Estimation method is (weighted) OLS. T is a 0,1 
dummy variable denoting a property location within a renewal area. POST similarly denotes that the respec-
tive renewal area has been designated. A similarly denotes whether the nearest area has been released from 
the program. V is the number of years that have gone by since designation. The cumulated effect after 20 years 
is the combination of the short-run level shift and the long-run effect: exp(𝛽0 + 𝛽1 × 20) − 1. Hedonic and 
location controls consist of covariates controlling for internal property and external location characteristics 
described in greater detail in the data section and the appendix. Block x area fixed effects are statistical block 
x renewal area x investigation area fixed effects. Time-varying controls are sets of interaction effects of year 
effects and distance to the CBD, district effects and a consumption amenity measure described in the data 
section. Weighted model is weighted by the distance from the designation cut-off along a latent deprivation 
variable (Gaussian kernel , bandwidth according to Silverman-rule). Standard errors in parentheses are clus-
tered on Block x area fixed effects in all models. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Tab. 5. Varying groups of treated and controls  
No of areas Cumulated effect after 20 years % within 2 S.E. length 
of benchmark Treat. Control Iterations Mean S.D. Min Max 
Varying number of treated areas 
1 22 22 -0.02 0.63 -1.28 1.01 28.32% 
2 22 462 0.09 0.47 -1.26 0.99 30.40% 
5 22 2500 0.21 0.26 -0.79 0.86 37.48% 
10 22 2500 0.26 0.18 -0.43 0.78 47.08% 
15 22 2500 0.32 0.13 -0.12 0.72 66.80% 
20 22 2500 0.32 0.13 -0.18 0.69 64.44% 
Varying number of control areas 
22 1 22 0.51 0.47 -0.15 1.87 14.56% 
22 2 462 0.44 0.30 -0.20 1.09 31.72% 
22 5 2500 0.43 0.17 -0.09 0.90 58.88% 
22 10 2500 0.41 0.10 0.08 0.75 85.08% 
22 15 2500 0.41 0.07 0.20 0.65 97.32% 
22 20 2500 0.41 0.06 0.17 0.61 98.00% 
Varying number of treated and control areas 
1 1 2261 0.24 1.74 -14.05 19.46 12.20% 
2 2 2500 0.32 0.60 -4.00 2.76 19.40% 
5 5 2500 0.38 0.31 -0.97 1.45 37.96% 
10 10 2500 0.40 0.17 -0.18 1.01 60.88% 
15 15 2500 0.41 0.11 0.06 0.76 84.36% 
20 20 2500 0.41 0.10 0.02 0.72 83.60% 
Notes: Each row describes the distribution of the cumulated effects after 20 years derived from a series of estima-
tions of the benchmark specification (equations 1 + 2). The effects are expressed in units of log-differences. 
We consider all possible combinations of one or two treated vs. all (22) control areas and vice versa. For all 
other combinations we use 2,500 randomly drawn selections. All models estimated using (unweighted) OLS. 
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1 Introduction 
This technical appendix complements the main paper by providing complementary evidence and 
additional details on the data used. The appendix is not designed to stand alone or replace the 
main paper. Section 2 adds to the empirical strategy and data section of the main paper, providing 
further details on the renewal areas, the control groups, and the data. Section 3 provides comple-
mentary evidence that extends the results in sections 4 and 5 of the main paper. Finally, section 4 
contains our analysis of potential externality and spillover effects.  
2 Data 
This section provides additional information on the studied areas and descriptive evidence not 
reported in the main paper to save space. 
2.1 Berlin – stylized facts 
Our study area comprises the area of the Federal State of Berlin, Germany. The city in 2012 count-
ed some 3.3 million inhabitants and approximately 1.9 million dwelling units. Approximately 14% 
of the population are non-German citizens. While there have recently been signs of economic re-
covery after a relatively long period of economic struggle since unification, the unemployment 
rate has remained relatively high at approximately 13%. The overall area is approximately 892 
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square kilometers (344 square miles). The center is densely populated, the overall building struc-
ture is a mix of historic buildings (aged approximately 100 to 130 years), buildings constructed 
after World War II to substitute the destroyed building stock (aged approximately 50–60 years), 
and newer buildings. 
2.2  Renewal and investigation areas 
This subsection presents the studied areas in greater detail. To convey an understanding of the 
size and form of the relevant space, Figure 1 in the main paper depicts the renewal and investiga-
tion areas. Figure A1 provides a more detailed picture of a cluster of renewal areas (gray) in East 
Berlin. Those parts of the investigation areas that were not transformed into renewal areas are 
hatched (diagonal parallel lines). It is reassuring that the matched observations (red X) and the 
investigation areas cover similar areas (if outside the 500m buffer), while geographically proxi-
mate but structurally different areas (for example, Wedding) are underrepresented. Some tech-
nical details on the matching technique are discussed in the following subsection.   
In Table A1, we present some additional descriptive statistics on the renewal areas, including ex-
act dates of the beginning and end of the designation, and the number of housing units, properties, 
and population.  
– Figure A1 about here – 
– Table A1 about here – 
2.3 Renovation subsidies vs. capitalization effects 
To put the €1.94 billion invested in renewal areas into context we approximate the total value of 
the housing stock in these areas. We compute the average property value as the average price in 
the renewal areas, discounted by a repeated-sales index that we normalize to a period ranging 
from 1998 to 2002, which is roughly the midpoint of the renewal program period. To construct a 
repeated sales index we estimate the following regression model:  
𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝜑𝑡
𝑡≠(1998,…,2002)
+ 𝜃𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  
, where Pit is the price at which a property i is sold at time t. We exclude single family homes as 
they are practically non-existent in the renewal areas. X are observable property characteristics 
discussed in the main paper, and 𝜃𝑖 is a set of property fixed effects holding all time-invariant lo-
cation effects constant. The time effects 𝜑𝑡  form the repeated sales price index, which we use to 
discount the 2012 mean property price in renewal areas to the base value (1998–2002). We then 
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multiply the resulting property value of €927,908 by the total number of properties in the renew-
al areas (5,844), which results in a total value of €5.42bn. The total expenditures attributable to 
the renewal policy thus amount to as much as 35.7% of the property value in the targeted areas.  
The approximated total value of the housing stock can also serve to shed some light on the return 
on investment of the policy instrument. Drawing on the results in Table 4 in the main paper (col-
umns (3) and (6)), the cumulated increase in housing value corresponds to a(n) (upper-) lower-
bound estimate of an insignificant 1.08% (significant 48.96%) of the total housing value 
(€5.42bn). Setting these figures in relation to the overall investment of €1.94bn results in a return 
of €0.03–€1.37 per invested Euro which implies limited multiplier effects. While the windfall cap-
ital gains to landlords might have to some extent capitalized into housing value, the results do not 
indicate the presence of a strong housing externality, i.e., an effect of renovations on the value of 
buildings other than those renovated.  
2.4 Control groups 
This section discusses the different control groups and presents some technical details on the 
creation of control group IV. Overall, we observe approximately 71,000 transactions between 
1990 and 2012 in Berlin. Of these transactions, 4,500 occurred inside our renewal areas. The 
transactions are compared to varying control groups. Control group I comprises all other transac-
tions (outside a 500m buffer) and control group II all transactions in a 500–2,000 meter radius 
around the renewal areas. Control group III consists of the investigation areas and includes ap-
proximately 7,800 transactions. The matching procedure discussed below results in about 4,800 
transactions that are matched to our renewal area transactions (control group IV).  
We generate control group IV using a synthetic matching technique: We use the propensity score 
matching methodology advanced by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) to find observations that are 
structurally similar to the transactions in the renewal areas. For the estimation of models 4 and 6 
in tables 2–4 in the main paper we include the following covariates: age of the building, building 
type, location quality, typical area floor space index, distance to the nearest park, main street, 
playground, waterway, and public transport station, latitude and longitude, and a set of dummies 
controlling for land use and east/west location. We match the treatment group to the control 
group using nearest-neighbor matching. The matching process creates subsamples, where the 
difference in means between the treatment and the control group is substantially reduced. Table 
A2 reports measures of the balance of the covariates for the control group IV.   
– Table A2 about here – 
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3 Baseline models: complementary evidence 
This section complements sections 4 and 5 of the main paper. The first subsection provides an 
overview of the variables and presents some of the estimation results omitted in the main paper. 
Section 3.2 discusses in detail how we approximate the latent deprivation variable and the cut-off 
value that determines designation. Section 3.3 discusses the potential problem of sample selec-
tion. Section 3.4 evaluates the robustness of our results to the inclusion of pre-treatment trends. 
Section 3.5 presents results for alternating combinations of the time-varying effects. Section 3.6 
discusses changes in the spatial structure of the city to put our renewal estimates into some con-
text. Section 3.7 considers alternative ways to account for the spatial autocorrelation of the stand-
ard errors in our model. Section 3.8 evaluates possible designation effects on the runner-up areas 
that remained unconsidered. In section 3.9, we replicate our benchmark results using an urban 
amenity density measure based on historic data. Finally, section 3.10 presents the results of the 
sensitivity analysis using the expanded model including time varying effects. 
3.1  Complete results 
Table A3 provides descriptive statistics of all structural and locational variables. Table A4 extends 
Table 4 in the main paper by presenting the implicit hedonic prices of the structural characteris-
tics. 
– Table A3 about here – 
– Table A4 about here – 
Most coefficients are as expected: To mention some examples, plot area and floor space signifi-
cantly increase log prices. The land use indicators show, if significant, a positive influence of resi-
dential and commercial areas on log prices (relative to manufacturing sites). The age of a building 
tends to depreciate its (log) price. 
3.2  Weighted estimates using control group III 
To form a strong counterfactual, the selection of renewal areas from the pool of considered inves-
tigation areas has to be random. We conducted an extensive review of the official documentation 
on the selection process. We found no evidence of a ranking of the investigation areas according 
to deprivation or need. Instead, there exist several records stating that the considered investiga-
tion areas all fulfill the necessary criteria to be designated as renewal areas, but that budget con-
straints do not allow for further designations (Senatsverwaltung für Stadtentwicklung Berlin, 
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1995, 1997). The official documentation suggests that selection was random with respect to dep-
rivation levels and, if anything, was guided by a need to achieve a balanced geographical distribu-
tion across districts. 
Yet, it seems possible that the selection was guided by a needs assessment at least implicitly.1 In a 
complementary approach we proceed under the assumption that there is a latent variable that 
summarizes the degree of area deprivation, and that limited funds resulted in a cut-off beyond 
which no further designation was viable. As a proxy for this latent variable we recover the pre-
dicted values from an auxiliary regression of designation status on a range of investigation area 
characteristics. 
The implementation of this strategy was complicated by the fact that the official reports are not or 
are no longer available for all originally considered investigation areas. Thus, to compile a data set 
describing the initial socio-economic conditions of the considered investigation areas we had to 
rely on our own data collection. We compiled a data set using GIS (the number of parks and play-
grounds per square kilometer, the number of schools and kindergartens per square kilometer, the 
distance to the nearest public transport station), historic land value assessments (Boden-
richtwerte), property transaction data (floor area ratio, share of stove heating, outside wc, outside 
bathroom, all from 1992), and demographic information (age structure at block level 1992).  
To validate our measures and to ensure that the data we process is consistent with the infor-
mation that was available to decision-makers, we extracted similar information from the investi-
gation area reports that were available at State Archive Berlin (Landesarchiv Berlin). We report 
the correlation between our self-constructed measures and those extracted from the official doc-
uments (where available) in Table A5. We find a strong correlation between our self-constructed 
data (left column) and the archived records (right column) for most of the variables, indicating 
that the collected data set describes the investigation areas in 1992 sufficiently well.  
– Table A5 about here – 
These self-constructed variables are input into an auxiliary OLS regression where the dependent 
variable is a 0,1 dummy variable indexing areas that were designated and became renewal areas. 
The predicted values from this regression are recovered as a proxy for the propensity to be desig-
nated as a renewal area, given the covariates. Given that 22 out of 44 investigation areas were 
                                                             
1  We thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion. 
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designated we unsurprisingly find that a cut-off point of 0.5 best predicts whether or not an area 
was designated or not. Nineteen of the 22 renewal areas that have been designated have a pro-
pensity score that exceeds this cut-off value, suggesting that we have predicted the selection rea-
sonably well. The left panel of Figure A2 plots the propensity score against the actual designation 
outcome and the cut-off point. 
To restrict the identifying variation to the fraction that is most plausibly exogenous we weight all 
observations in our baseline difference-in-differences specification according to their distance 
from the threshold using a Gaussian kernel.  In particular, we weight transactions in area s using 
the following area-specific weight:  
𝑤𝑠 =
1
𝜆√2𝜋
exp (−
1
2
(
𝑆𝑠 − 𝑆̅
𝜆
)
2
) 
, where 𝜆 is the bandwidth which we set according to the Silverman (1986) rule:  𝜆 = 1.06 ×
𝜎𝑁−
1
5. The right panel of Figure A2 illustrates the resulting weight distribution. 
– Figure A2 about here – 
As an alternative we consider a binary weighting scheme where all observations receive a weight 
of one if they fall within a window around the cut-off value, and zero otherwise. Within the small-
est window we consider of 0.05, four out of eight investigation areas were selected as renewal 
areas. 
In columns (1–3) of Table A6 we explore how the estimated effects on the propensity of a building 
being in poor condition depends on the choice of the weighting scheme. In columns (1–2) we 
halve and double the optimal bandwidth used in Table 2, column 4. In column (3) we use the bina-
ry weighting scheme with the smallest bandwidth. The results fall within a very narrow range and 
are close to the baseline in Table 2 in the main paper. In columns (4–6) we similarly alter the 
weighting scheme of the baseline model in Table 3, column 4, in the main paper, which analyzes 
the policy effects on the propensity of a building being in good condition. The variation is some-
what larger than in columns (1–3), but is still within a relatively small range. More local estimates 
tend to produce larger policy effects, which is in line with the results presented in the main paper. 
In Table A7 we similarly alter the weighting scheme and explore the sensitivity of the estimated 
price effects. We, again, halve and double the optimal bandwidth (1 and 3) and present the results 
with the optimal bandwidth for comparison (2). We also present the results using the binary 
weighting scheme and a window bandwidth of 0.05, 0.1, and 0.2. The policy effect remains rough-
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ly within the same range across all specifications. There is no clear correlation between the size of 
the bandwidth and the magnitude of the estimated policy effect.  
– Table A6 about here – 
– Table A7 about here – 
3.3 Sample selection 
One concern with our data is that we only observe the price and the quality of a property if and 
when it is transacted. If properties of higher quality sell quicker it is theoretically possible that the 
policy will increase the number of transactions in the treated areas. In this case the marginal 
transacted home in the treated areas could be of lower quality, which could affect the estimated 
treatment effect.2 To test the effect of the policy on the number of transactions we collapse our 
data set to observational year-block units and compute the number of transactions within each 
unit. We then replicate our standard set of estimations (tables 2–4 in the main paper) using the 
log of the number of transactions as dependent variables. The results presented in Table A8 reveal 
that in relative terms the number of transactions in the treated areas declined over time, suggest-
ing that landlords hold longer to their properties. Thus, if anything, the selection effect will in-
crease the estimated policy effect (because the marginal property is of higher quality), once more 
suggesting that the effects of the policy are likely moderate. 
– Table A8 about here – 
To substantiate this interpretation we replicate the analysis using so-called standard land values 
(Bodenrichtwerte) from the Berlin Committee of Valuation Experts (Gutachterausschuss für 
Grundstückswerte). Land values assessed by such committees, which exist throughout Germany, 
capture the fair market value of a square metre of land if it was undeveloped. These assessed land 
values are, thus, supposed to abstract entirely from structural values. The assessment by these 
committees is based on recent market transactions and is generally considered reliable (Weiss, 
2004). Ahlfeldt et al. (2015), who use similar data, show that the standard land values tend to 
closely follow market prices. The results presented in Table A9 are below the estimated treatment 
effects on property prices, which is in line with the sample-selection interpretation above and 
provides further evidence that the policy effects, if anything, were small. 
                                                             
2  We owe this idea to an anonymous referee. 
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– Table A9 about here – 
3.4  Pre-trends 
As with every difference-in-differences estimation strategy we assume that in the absence of des-
ignation the renewal areas and the control areas would have followed similar trends. This as-
sumption can generally not be tested, but it is at least possible to evaluate whether the respective 
areas followed similar trends prior to the intervention. To allow for pre-trends we expand our 
baseline treatment function as follows: 
𝑓(𝑇𝑖 × 𝑉𝑠𝑡) = 𝛽𝑃𝑇𝑖 × 𝑉𝑠𝑡 × (1 − 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑠𝑡) + 𝛽0𝑇𝑖 × 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑖 × 𝑉𝑠𝑡 × 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑠𝑡 
, where 𝑉𝑠𝑡 denotes the years since the designation of a renewal area during the pre-period. 𝑉𝑠𝑡 
takes negative values for the period pre-designation and a zero value afterwards (e.g., -1 for one 
year before designation and -2 for two years before designation). 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑠𝑡 indicates observations 
after designation (𝑉𝑠𝑡 > 0). T similarly indicates a location inside a renewal area. Plugging this 
treatment function into the baseline estimation equation (1) leads to the results presented in Ta-
ble A10.  
We report results for three different dependent variables, the propensity of a property being in 
poor condition, the propensity of a property being in good condition, and the log of sales prices. In 
each case we report the results excluding and including time-varying effects. The results reported 
thus correspond to columns (3) and (6) in tables 2, 3, and 4 in the main paper. In five out of these 
six models we find no significant difference in the trends between treated and control areas prior 
to the treatment, which makes it less likely that our estimated policy effects are driven by unrelat-
ed trends. In case of the price regression including time-varying effects (column (6)) we find a 
significantly negative pre-trend which, if the extrapolation were to be taken as the counterfactual, 
would imply that we have underestimated the policy effect. While we prefer to avoid an extrapola-
tion of the pre-trend because the pre-period is short relative to the post period, we argue that all 
of the six models suggest that the results reported in the main paper are unlikely to be driven by 
long-run trends that are correlated with the treatment. 
– Table A10 about here – 
3.5  Time-varying effects 
In columns (6) and (7) of tables (2–4) in the main paper we control for unobserved trends that 
are correlated with observable locational characteristics using a relatively extensive set of time-
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varying effects. We interact distance to the CBD, an amenity density measure, and a full set of dis-
trict effects with year fixed effects. One concern with this approach is that changes in the implicit 
prices of these variables (e.g., distance to the CBD) could be driven by the policy, in which case the 
time-varying controls would be absorbing variation that is genuinely attributable to the policy. 
To address this concern we replicate the baseline models using a number of less extensive combi-
nations of time-varying effects. Table A11 displays the specification from Table 4 (columns (6) 
and (7)) from the main paper exclusively using the year x district effects (columns (1) and (2)), 
exclusively the consumption amenity x year effects (columns (3) and (4)), and the consumption 
amenity effects combined with an interaction of year effects and a dummy variable distinguishing 
between East/West Berlin (columns (5) and (6)). The evaluated policy effects on prices tend to 
react differently to the inclusion of the different time-varying effects, depending on whether we 
use as a control group the investigation areas (control group III, columns (1), (3), and (5)) or the 
matched observations (control group IV, columns (2), (4), and (6)). With district x year effects 
exclusively, the policy effect becomes insignificant if investigation areas are used as a control 
group (column (1)). District trends thus explain much of the heterogeneity in trends between re-
newal and investigation areas. In contrast, the policy effect remains relatively large and significant 
if the control group of matched observations is used (column (2)). Because we matched on the 
general location in the city using x- and y- coordinates as PSM covariates, the insensitivity to the 
inclusion of district x year effects when control group 4 is used does not come as a surprise. 
Using the matched control group the results are sensitive to the inclusion of controls for amenity 
trends (column (4)), which is conclusive given that we did not use this variable as a covariate in 
the PSM procedure. Interestingly, the effect remains relatively large if we control for amenity 
trends but not for district x year effects, and use the investigation areas as a control group (col-
umn (3)).  
The vast majority of renewal areas were designated in former East Berlin. We expect heterogene-
ous trends as the two parts of the city reintegrated into a common housing market area over our 
study period (Ahlfeldt et al., 2015). In columns (5) and (6) we therefore allow for trend heteroge-
neity with respect to the amenity density and a location within former East Berlin. This specifica-
tion is significantly less demanding than the expanded specifications in columns (6) and (7) of 
Table 4 of the main paper. Yet both specifications produce insignificant and near to zero treat-
ment effects.  
– Table A11 about here – 
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3.6 Urban spatial structure 
To put the magnitude of the policy effects into perspective we provide an analysis of the change in 
general spatial structure of Berlin over the course of the study area. We allow implicit prices of 
selected attributes to change by using the same approach as in the extended baseline model (in-
cluding time-varying effects).  
The arguably most popular summary statistic for within-urban spatial structure in urban econom-
ics is the distance from CBD gradients, a measure of property prices change as one moves away 
from the center of the city. We allow the effect of the proximity to the CBD to vary over time by 
means of distance from CBD x year interaction effects. Normalized to the initial value in 1991, we 
plot how the implicit price of centrality varies over time in the left panel of Figure A3.  
The study period we analyze covers the period during which the two parts of Berlin that were 
separated during the Cold War period integrated to a unified city. To gain insights into the speed 
of the convergence process we estimate East x year interactions effects, where East is a dummy 
variable indexing transactions within former East Berlin. The estimates are plotted in the right 
panel of Figure A3, again normalized by the initial value in 1991.  
The two panels reveal striking changes in the spatial structure of the city over the two post-
unification decades. From the mid-2000s onwards central parts of the city steadily appreciated 
relative to the rest of the city. The premium of a property at the center of the city relative to a sim-
ilar property 10km away increased by approximately 30% from 2004 to 2012. This is in line with 
the resurgence of central cities that has been debated in the consumer city literature (Glaeser et 
al., 2001). The appreciation process of East Berlin relative to West Berlin is even more impressive. 
Properties in East Berlin, on average, appreciated by about 145% relative to properties in West 
Berlin. The convergence process is concave, that is, the gap in growth rates between the two city 
parts gradually declines over time.  
These results are important to understanding the nature of the policy effect. Since most of the 
renewal areas are located in former East Berlin the renewal policy effects come in addition to an 
already very substantial increase in property prices across, in particular, the central areas of East 
Berlin. These results also explain why the inclusion of time-varying effects substantially reduces 
the renewal area effect.  
– Figure A3 about here – 
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3.7 Alternative standard errors 
In our benchmark specification reported in the main paper we allow for unobserved time-
invariant effects at the block level. Standard errors are clustered at the same level. Because statis-
tical blocks are relatively small we flexibly allow for a relatively complex (cross-sectional) spatial 
structure in the error terms at the expense of having relatively few observations within a block 
cell. We therefore expect relatively large standard errors, which leads to the concern that we may 
be raising the bar for rejecting the null-hypothesis (of no renewal effect) too high. In this section 
we consider alternative methods to compute standard errors. We focus on the lower-bound esti-
mates from the models, including time-varying effects, since the models excluding time-invariant 
effects generally produce highly significant results no matter how we compute standard errors.  
The results are reported in Table A12 where we also present the benchmark point estimates and 
standard errors (clustered on blocks) in column (1) for comparison. In column (2) we alter the 
clustering level to traffic cells (Verkehrszellen). Our sample of property transactions is distributed 
across 324 traffic cells which, on average, consist of about 40 blocks forming neighborhoods that 
are just about walkable. With this specification we assume independency of standard errors be-
tween much larger groups of transactions. In column (3) we further increase the size of the clus-
tering cells by using the 190 Berlin zip codes. As with the block level clustered standard errors the 
cumulated effect remains statistically insignificant. We note that the estimates also remain insig-
nificant if we alter the location fixed effects to the traffic or zip code level, despite a substantial 
increase in degrees of freedom.  
In an alternative approach to controlling for spatial dependence of the error, we adopt the proce-
dure suggested by Conley (1999). Using varying distance cut-offs, we calculate standard errors 
corrected for spatial autocorrelation, serial correlation, and heteroscedasticity adapted for panel 
data as in Hsiang (2010). The resulting standard errors are reported in columns (4) to (7) of Table 
A8. With a 50km cut-off, which essentially implies that correlation among all observations is al-
lowed for, we find standard errors that are marginally smaller than with clustered standard er-
rors. As we decrease the distance cut-off we tend to get smaller standard errors. However, even 
with cut-off distances that are way below conventional thresholds the estimated policy effect re-
Ahlfeldt / Maennig / Richter – Urban renewal after the Berlin Wall 12 
mains insignificant.3 We conclude that the lower-bound treatment effects are statistically not dis-
tinguishable from zero.  
– Table A12 about here – 
3.8 Designation effects on investigation areas 
One of the identifying assumptions of quasi-experimental research designs is that the control 
group used to establish a counterfactual must not be affected itself by the analyzed treatment. A 
control group formed by runner-ups in a selection process could violate this assumption if the 
selection of those being treated changes the expectation regarding the prospect of those remain-
ing untreated. If a positive signal to the treated areas represents a negative signal to the runner-
up areas, the estimated treatment effect would be positively biased. To avoid the potentially prob-
lematic direct comparison of the selected renewal areas to the runner-up areas, we benchmark 
both areas against the matched transactions (control group IV) discussed in section 2. We define 
the renewal areas and the “runner-up” investigation areas that remained undesignated as two 
separate treatment groups and assign all matched transactions outside the investigation areas to 
the control group. In Table A13, we report the results of two models that are analogous to (4) and 
(7) in Table 4 in the main paper, except for the added second treatment group (investigation are-
as). We choose 1995 as a (placebo) treatment date for the investigation areas that were not desig-
nated because the last wave of designation occurred in that year and the decision not to include 
these areas into the program became definitive.4 
For the investigation areas, the cumulated effects after 20 years are not statistically different from 
zero, no matter whether we allow for selected time-varying effects or not. This finding is con-
sistent with the results in Table 4 in the main paper, where the comparison of trends in renewal 
areas to either the remaining investigation areas or the matched transactions led to similar re-
sults. Taken together, the evidence does not indicate that the runner-up areas provide an invalid 
counterfactual.  
– Table A13 about here – 
                                                             
3  For US census data, distance cut-offs are often set at approximately 10 miles (Boarnet et al., 2005; Jeanty 
et al., 2010).  
4  Setting the placebo designation date to the date of the nearest renewal area changes the results only 
marginally. 
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3.9  Historic amenity density 
As outlined in the main paper, we employ a kernel-smoothed density surface interacted with year 
dummies based on the geographic location of bars, pubs, and nightclubs to account for the change 
in valuation over time for these urban amenities. The rationale behind this approach is that par-
ticular districts with great centrality, and many urban amenities, could have increased in value 
anyway and that this increase cannot be attributed to the designation of the renewal areas. The 
data stem from the open street map project. One concern is the potential endogeneity of the cur-
rent (2012) distribution of amenities to the designation of the renewal areas. To address this con-
cern, we provide an alternative approach as a robustness check: we collected data for the distribu-
tion of urban amenities for the years 1995/96, the first year in which the yellow pages for Berlin 
reported zip codes in a new format that applies to both parts of the formerly divided city and al-
lows for precise geocoding. Figure A4 compares the resulting 1995/96 kernel-smoothed density 
surface (left panel) with the existing current surface displayed in Figure 1 in the main paper (right 
panel): While there is a shift in amenity gravity from the south and north western to the eastern 
downtown areas, the overall centralized spatial pattern has remained remarkably stable over 
more than 15 years of convergence to a new post-Berlin Wall equilibrium. 
– Figure A4 about here – 
Table A14 replicates our expanded property price models (columns (6) and (7) in Table (4) using 
the consumption amenity density depicted in the left panel of Figure A2. Columns (1) and (2) re-
port the effects within renewal areas when compared to the investigation areas and the matched 
observations. The differences from our primary results are not substantial. As in our main results, 
no effects are significantly different from zero.  
– Table A14 about here – 
3.10 Simulation including time-varying effects 
This section replicates the sensitivity analysis presented in section 5 of the main paper for the 
model including time-varying effects (Table 4 column (6)). Similar to Table 5 in the main paper 
Table A15 summarizes the distributions and the share of point estimates. Corresponding to Figure 
3 in the main paper Figure A5 displays some selected distributions graphically. The implications 
are similar to those presented in the main paper. 
– Table A15 about here – 
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– Figure A5 about here – 
4 Externalities and spillover effects 
One justification for public expenditure on urban renewal policies rests on anticipated positive 
and self-reinforcing housing externalities, i.e., the hope that subsidies for the renovation of a 
property will benefit others in addition to the respective building or owner. With our baseline 
empirical models we establish a composite renewal effect which consists of an increase in the 
structural value of renovated properties and an increase in locational value due to the renovation 
of adjacent properties, i.e., a housing externality. In this section we aim at separating the effect of 
the (subsidized) renovation of buildings on their own value from the effects of increased nearby 
renovation activity. 
One attractive feature of our data set is an indication of a property’s physical condition at the time 
of transaction. We exploit this feature to determine the housing externality effect by exclusively 
focusing on properties in good condition. The rationale is twofold. First, by holding internal quali-
ty constant, our estimated treatment effects only capture appreciation related to the renovation of 
surrounding properties, i.e., (a housing) an external(ity) effect. Second, we argue that properties 
in good condition at the time of the transaction are unlikely to be renovated immediately follow-
ing the transaction, and hence that renovation incentives (subsidies and tax deductions) do not 
(or only to a limited extent) capitalize into transaction prices. We complement this approach to 
measuring housing externalities with an analysis of spatial spillovers into areas just outside the 
treated areas. Before we present our actual empirical specification, we introduce the basic nature 
of the treatment effect we estimate. 
4.1  Identification 
Let us assume we observe a property, the maintenance levels of which are constant within a 
neighborhood and depend on a housing subsidy S. Within a neighborhood, the housing subsidy 
policy is uniform. 
At any given location, the value of a property (P) depends on the maintenance level (I), a (housing) 
externality (E), which depends on the maintenance level in the neighborhood and the amenity 
level (L) of the neighborhood, and the overall macroeconomic conditions that are invariant across 
neighborhoods (Y). For now, we assume that the policy does not impact neighborhood quality 
except through a housing externality: 
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 𝑃 = 𝑓(𝐼(𝑆), 𝐸(𝐼(𝑆)), 𝐿, 𝑌)  
For simplicity, we assume that the externality is simply the aggregate of individual maintenance 
levels at all locations within the neighborhood, i.e., there is no spatial decay within the neighbor-
hood. In a linear neighborhood aligned along one dimension D from zero to one, we can then 
simply write: 
 
𝐸(𝐷) = ∫ 𝐼(𝐷)𝑑(𝐷) =
1
0
𝐼  
Taking the total derivative we can rewrite the price equation as follows: 
 
𝑑𝑃 = (
𝜕𝑃
𝜕𝐼(𝑆)
+
𝜕𝑃
𝜕𝐸(𝑆)
) 𝑑𝐼(𝑆) +
𝜕𝑃
𝜕𝐿
𝑑𝐿 +
𝜕𝑃
𝜕𝑌
𝑑𝑌  
Or: 
 
𝑑𝑃 = (
𝜕𝑃
𝜕𝐼
+
𝜕𝑃
𝜕𝐸
)
𝜕𝐼
𝜕𝑆
𝑑𝑆 +
𝜕𝑃
𝜕𝐿
𝑑𝐿 +
𝜕𝑃
𝜕𝑌
𝑑𝑌  
To identify the effect of the policy on property values, we essentially employ the difference-in-
differences methodology that compares the value of properties at different points in time (first 
difference ∆) and at different locations (second difference d). We assume that a change in policy 
∆S has an effect only on properties in a treatment neighborhood (T) but not in an otherwise com-
parable control neighborhood (C) that is subject to the same macroeconomic shocks (∆𝑌𝑇 =
∆𝑌𝐶).5 
Our treatment effect can be described as follows: 
 
𝛽 = (𝑃(𝑆 = 1)𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇 − 𝑃((𝑆 = 0)𝑃𝑅𝐸)𝑇 − (𝑃(𝑆 = 0)𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇 − 𝑃(𝑆 = 0)𝑃𝑅𝐸)𝐶   
Or:  
 
𝛽 = ∆𝑃𝑇 − ∆𝑃𝐶   
                                                             
5  In the empirical implementation, we introduce a buffer around the treated areas to ensure that the con-
trol group is not affected by the treatment through spillover effects.  
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If we assume L to be time-invariant at any location, i.e., ∆L=0, our treatment effect is defined as 
follows:  
 
𝛽 = ((
𝜕𝑃
𝜕𝐼
+
𝜕𝑃
𝜕𝐸
)
𝜕𝐼
𝜕𝑆
∆𝑆 +
𝜕𝑃
𝜕𝑌
∆𝑌)
𝑇
− ((
𝜕𝑃
𝜕𝐼
+
𝜕𝑃
𝜕𝐸
)
𝜕𝐼
𝜕𝑆
∆𝑆 +
𝜕𝑃
𝜕𝑌
∆𝑌)
𝐶
  
Or:  
 
𝛽 = (
𝜕𝑃
𝜕𝐼
+
𝜕𝑃
𝜕𝐸
)
𝜕𝐼
𝜕𝑆
, where ∆𝑆 = {
1 if treated
0 if control
  
There are important implications for our empirical strategy that aims to estimate 𝛽. Given an ap-
propriately defined control group, the difference-in-differences coefficient identifies a composite 
effect determined by the impact of the policy on maintenance levels in the neighborhood 
((𝜕𝐼 𝜕𝑆)⁄ ∆𝑆), and the valuation of internal quality (𝜕𝑃 𝜕𝐼⁄ ) and the housing externality (𝜕𝑃 𝜕𝐸⁄ ) if 
the effect of internal housing quality is not held constant in an empirical model. To the extent that 
the interior quality effect can be held constant empirically ((𝜕𝑃 𝜕𝐼⁄ )∆𝑆 = 0), the treatment re-
flects the externality effect caused by the policy (𝛽 = (𝜕𝑃 𝜕𝐸)⁄ (𝜕𝐼 𝜕𝑆)⁄ ). With the data we have at 
hand, we are able to hold the interior quality effect constant by restricting the transactions sample 
to properties in good condition. 
4.2 Empirical strategy 
For a given year since designation, our baseline treatment estimate reflects the cumulative effect 
of the improvement in the maintenance condition of a sold property i on the price of i and the ex-
ternal effect of the improvements in all other properties j in the same neighborhood as i on the 
price of i. Unlike the theoretical example, the externality of buildings j and i is discounted by dis-
tance Dij and may include the social externality of new residents moving into upgraded buildings:  
 
𝛽𝑉 =
𝜕𝑃
𝜕𝐼
𝜕𝐼𝑖𝑉
𝜕𝑆𝑖𝑉
+
𝜕𝑃
𝜕𝐸
∑
𝜕𝐼𝑗𝑉
𝜕𝑆𝑗𝑉𝑗 
𝜏(𝐷𝑖𝑗), where  𝜏(𝐷) > 0 and 𝜏
′(𝐷) < 0  
Building quality 
In a first alternation to the baseline specification presented in the main paper, we only consider 
buildings in good condition to hold the quality of the traded buildings constant (𝑑𝐼𝑖 = 𝜕𝐼𝑖 𝜕𝑆𝑖⁄ =
0). Hence the estimated treatment effect collapses to 𝛽 = (𝜕𝑃 𝜕𝐸)⁄ ∑ 𝜕𝐼𝑗 𝜕𝑆𝑗⁄𝑗 𝜏(𝐷𝑖𝑗). We choose 
to restrict the sample to properties in good condition (as opposed to poor condition), as it is less 
likely that these buildings will be renovated shortly after the transaction. It is therefore also less 
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likely that anticipated tax abatements or renovation subsidies are capitalized in the sales price. 
With this approach, theoretically, we only capture the effects of improvements in the quality of 
buildings j on the price of a sold building i and, hence, a housing externality promoted by the poli-
cy. In practice, this approach to separating the internal and the external maintenance effect comes 
with some limitations. First, our data set offers information on whether a property, at the time of 
the transaction, was in a particularly good or poor condition. While this is significantly more in-
formation than available in most comparable data sets, this is also evidently a highly aggregated 
data. Second, we have assumed that there are no policy effects on neighborhood quality other 
than through housing externalities. If there are significant direct investments in the quality of lo-
cal public goods, e.g., the renovation of schools or playgrounds, these location features become a 
function of the policy. Adding these features Qq(S) to the original price equation results in an addi-
tional component in the treatment effect we measure: 
 
𝛽𝑉 = (
𝜕𝑃
𝜕𝐼
𝜕𝐼𝑖𝑉
𝜕𝑆𝑖𝑉
+)
𝜕𝑃
𝜕𝐸
∑
𝜕𝐼𝑗𝑉
𝜕𝑆𝑗𝑉𝑗 
𝜏(𝐷𝑖𝑗) + ∑
𝜕𝑃
𝜕𝑄𝑞
𝜕𝑄𝑗𝑞
𝜕𝑆𝑗𝑞𝑞 
  
As such improvements in Qq(S) are difficult to observe, it is difficult to separate them from the 
housing externalities. We employ an alternative approach to measuring housing externalities, 
focusing on spillovers into areas just outside renewal areas. This approach, which is described 
next, is closer to RH. It suffers, however, from a similar problem in that it is difficult to separate 
the housing externality spillover effect from an accessibility effect to improved local public goods 
in nearby areas. In practice, this interpretation problem is mitigated by the fact that both ap-
proaches consistently indicate that the joint neighborhood effect (housing externality and local 
public goods effect) are fairly limited. Irrespective of this problem, a significant reduction in the 
treatment effect when holding building quality constant indicates the presence of a significant 
internal capitalization effect. 
Spillover effects 
One of the advantages of the above approach is that we aim at measuring policy-induced housing 
externalities where they are presumably strongest, i.e., within renewal areas. One of the problems 
with this approach, as discussed, is that the information we use on building maintenance is imper-
fect. We therefore employ an alternative approach in which we focus on areas just outside the 
designated renewal areas. While attenuated, housing externalities should still be present in these 
areas. Moreover, any price effect will not be confounded with the policy effect on the internal 
quality of buildings because the respective areas did not qualify for subsidies. The treatment ef-
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fect we estimate, hence, depends purely on the valuation of the housing externality and the policy 
effect on the maintenance level of buildings j in a nearby renewal area, discounted by distance D: 
 
𝛽𝑉 =
𝜕𝑃
𝜕𝐸
∑
𝜕𝐼𝑗𝑉
𝜕𝑆𝑗𝑉𝑗 
𝜏(𝐷𝑖𝑗), where  𝜏(𝐷) > 0 and 𝜏
′(𝐷) < 0  
This approach also mitigates another concern, namely, that the authorities reserve the right to 
levy the increase in land value generated by the policy (“Ausgleichsabgabe”). By the end of 2011, 
local authorities had generated €68 million ($93.3 million) in levies. The total expected levies 
estimated by the local administration amounted to €211m ($285.3m) based on an estimated av-
erage increase in land value of €45 ($60.8) per m² (Senatsverwaltung für Stadtentwicklung 
Berlin, 2012), which are strikingly low figures compared to the above-mentioned investment vol-
umes.6 Property prices could be negatively affected.  
To detect spillovers, we alter the definition of the treatment T measure and the control groups 
relative to the benchmark specification (see equation 1 in the main paper). In the first alteration, 
we redefine our treatment measure as a binary variable that takes the value of TS1i=1 if a property 
falls within a 500m buffer area and zero otherwise. We run this specification using the two treat-
ment functions introduced above and varying control groups.  
Control groups 
For the spillover models described above we define a second set of control groups (A-I to A-IV), 
where we employ 6,600 transactions that are located in a 500 meter radius around the renewal 
areas as a treatment, and compare them to all other transactions (A-I), to all transactions in a 500 
to 2,000 meter radius around the renewal areas (A-II, includes 12,800 obs.), to the investigation 
areas plus a 1,000 meter buffer around them (A-III, includes 14,700 obs.), and to a matched group 
(A-IV, includes 6,000 obs.). We use the same PSM matching technique as described in section 2.3 
in the main paper to find matched pairs for the transactions within a 500m buffer around the re-
newal areas. Transactions inside the renewal areas are completely excluded from the sample for 
the estimations of the spillover effects. Table A16 reports measures of the balance of the covari-
ates for the matched control group.   
– Table A16 about here – 
                                                             
6 All income generated through this source is reinvested in the district’s infrastructure or in neighborhood 
improvements.  
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4.3 Empirical results  
Building quality 
Table A17 replicates our baseline approach (Table 4 in the main paper) using only buildings in 
good physical condition. When using control groups I (all properties outside renewal areas) and II 
(properties outside and within 2km of renewal areas) we find effects that are economically close 
to zero and statistically not distinguishable from zero. This is in stark contrast to the large and 
significant effects found for all properties (reported in Table 4, columns (1) and (2) in the main 
paper). With our preferred control groups III (investigation areas) and IV (matched properties) 
the standard errors increase substantially as the number of observations decrease. The point es-
timates are, again, not statistically distinguishable from zero, but given the large magnitudes and 
inconsistent directions this seems primarily attributable to limited degrees of freedom. Given the 
already limited degrees of freedom we also do not estimate the demanding model with time-
varying effects on this sample. Still, a comparison of columns (1) and (2) in particular to the re-
spective Table 4 in the main paper suggests that the benchmark results are not primarily driven 
by externality effects.  
– Table A17 about here – 
Spillover effects 
Table A18 and Figure A6 replicate the benchmark analysis for the spillover areas, i.e., the 500m 
buffer adjacent to the renewal areas. As the external areas have not been targeted by the policy, 
housing externalities can be identified using all buildings irrespective of their maintenance condi-
tion. The 500m buffer area previously excluded due to the presence of spillovers now serves as a 
treatment group to detect spillover effects. Lower thresholds generally yield similar results but 
suffer from a loss of degrees of freedom.  
For control groups (A-I and A-III), we find effects that correspond to about one-fourth (3) to 
slightly less than one half (1) of the corresponding renewal area effects reported in Table 4 in the 
main paper. While statistically significant, the effect on the renewal area buffer with our preferred 
control group III is no more than 0.7% per year. Moreover, the time-varying buffer area results 
reported in Figure 6 cast some doubt on the nature of the treatment effect captured by model (1). 
As long as 10 years after designation the treated follow exactly the same trend as the control 
group, which is remarkable given the naïve definition of control group I. After 10 to 12 years, the 
trends suddenly start to diverge. This divergence coincides with the appreciation of central areas, 
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which started in 2004 as revealed by Figure A3, which indicates that the treatment effect could be 
spurious. This impression is substantiated by the significant reduction in the long-run treatment 
effect once we control for time-varying effects. 
The outlier in Table 18 is model (4) which, using group IV, yields the surprising result of a treat-
ment effect on the renewal area buffer which is almost as large as the effect on the renewal area 
itself (Table 4 in the main paper). This is not a conclusive result because even in the presence of 
strong housing externalities the typically steep spatial decay should imply a significantly smaller 
treatment effect on the buffer area (Rossi-Hansberg et al., 2010). It thus seems likely that the ef-
fects in column (4) – and therefore also in the respective model in Table 4 in the main paper – are 
driven by some unobserved heterogeneity that affects property price trends over time. This inter-
pretation is supported by the model controlling for such trends by means of time-varying effects 
in column (6), which yields insignificant results. Controlling for time-varying treatment effects we 
even find a small but significant negative effect when using control group III (column 5). Taken 
together, we do not find conclusive evidence of the presence of spillover effects, which is in line 
with the limited multiplier effects of the policy and the insignificant capitalization effects for 
properties in good condition.  
– Table A18 about here – 
– Figure A6 about here – 
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Figures 
Fig. A1. Snapshot renewal areas 
 
Notes: Own illustration based on the urban and environmental information system (Senatsverwaltung für 
Stadtentwicklung Berlin, 2006). Dark shaded (hatched) areas indicate renewal (investigation) areas. 
Black (red) crosses indicate (matched) transactions (in control group IV).  
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Fig. A2. Designation propensity and Gaussian kernel weights 
Prediction and cut-off point Weight distribution 
 
  
Notes: The propensity score are the predicted values from regressions of a 0,1 selection variable (being selected 
or not being selected as a renewal area) on a range of area characteristics capturing the socio-economic 
conditions in 1992. The weight function uses a Gaussian kernel based on distance from the 0.5 cut-off val-
ue (dashed lines) and a bandwidth selected according to the Silverman-rule. 
 
Fig. A3. Time-varying distance from CBD and East Berlin effects 
Distance to CBD 
 
East Berlin  
 
Notes: Figures plot interaction effects of distance from CBD (left) and an East Berlin dummy (right) and year ef-
fects, normalized to 1991. The estimates are from a regression similar to the model reported in Table 
(column 6) in the main paper, where we replace the district x year effects with east x year effects. 
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Fig. A4. Kernel-smoothed density surfaces comparison 
Historic distribution 
 
Current distribution
 
Notes: Notes: Own illustration based on the urban and environmental information system (Senatsverwaltung für 
Stadtentwicklung Berlin, 2006). Smooth gray-shaded areas represent the consumption amenity density in 
1995/96 (left panel) and 2012 (right panel).  
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Fig. A5. Distribution of simulated point estimates – including time-varying effects 
Separately varying number of treatment (black) & control areas (gray) 
1 random area selected (1 treated vs 22 control) 
 
2 random areas selected (2 treated vs 22 control) 
 
  
5 random areas selected (5 treated vs 22 control) 15 random areas selected (15 treated vs 22 control) 
  
Simultaneously varying number of treatment & control areas 
5 random areas selected (5 treated vs 5 control) 15 random areas selected (15 treated vs 15 control) 
  
Notes: In the upper two rows, black (gray) solid lines depict the kernel density of cumulated effects when varying 
the number of renewal (investigation) areas and comparing them to all investigation (treatment) areas. The 
black vertical lines depict the cumulated effect of our benchmark model (solid) plus/minus two standard er-
ror lengths (dashed). 
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Fig. A6. Price trends in spillover areas, relative to varying control groups 
 
Notes: Figure illustrates the renewal spillover effects on a 500m buffer area surrounding renewal areas. Estimates 
are based on the equation described in section (4), including (light dashed lines) or excluding (dark solid 
lines) time-varying treatment effects 𝐺𝑖𝑡 and using the log of property price as the dependent variable. The 
parametric equivalents are in Table A18, column 1 (solid left), column 3 (solid right), and, column 5 
(dashed-right). The parametric equivalent to the light dashed line in the left panel is not reported in Table 
18 to save space. Error bars indicate the 95% confidence intervals. 
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Tables 
Tab A1. Descriptive statistics renewal areas 
Name Start End 
Area 
(km2) Properties 
 Dwelling 
units Residents 
Samariterviertel 09.10.1993 10.02.2008 0.339 263 5,302 8,324 
Warschauer Strasse 04.12.1994 28.04.2011 0.381 227 5,110 8,599 
Traveplatz Ostkreuz 04.12.1994 11.07.2010 0.351 204 4,380 6,964 
Kaskelstrasse 04.12.1994 10.02.2008 0.221 248 1,665 3,394 
Weitlingstrasse 04.12.1994 28.01.2009 0.503 331 4,214 5,337 
Spandauer Vorstadt 09.10.1993 10.02.2008 0.671 632 5,809 8,771 
Beusselstrasse 04.12.1994 21.02.2007 0.106 93 2,314 3,045 
Rosenthaler Vorstadt 04.12.1994 28.01.2009 0.376 373 4,809 6,794 
Stephankiez 10.11.1995 21.02.2007 0.063 54 1,288 1,860 
Soldiner Strasse 10.11.1995 21.02.2007 0.019 11 447 661 
Wederstrasse 10.11.1995 11.07.2010 0.246 233 1,341 2,079 
Kottbusser Damm Ost 10.11.1995 21.02.2007 0.025 21 380 522 
Kollwitzplatz 09.10.1993 28.01.2009 0.607 476 6,519 11,412 
Helmholtzplatz 09.10.1993 09.12.2014 0.819 560 13,338 21,211 
Winsstrasse 04.12.1994 28.04.2011 0.348 219 4,850 8,568 
Wollankstrasse 04.12.1994 28.04.2011 0.685 338 3,386 7,719 
Teutoburger Platz 04.12.1994 12.02.2013 0.498 316 4,432 7,950 
Komponistenviertel 04.12.1994 11.07.2010 0.339 477 3,443 7,400 
Boetzowstrasse 10.11.1995 28.04.2011 0.381 191 3,072 6,211 
Altstadt Kiez Vorstadt 09.10.1993 21.02.2007 0.351 225 1,105 2,115 
Niederschöneweide 04.12.1994  0.221 97 799 1,368 
Oberschöneweide 10.11.1995 11.07.2010 0.503 255 3,465 5,375 
Notes: The data for area, properties, dwelling units, and residents are from the Berlin administrative unit for urban 
development and environment (Senatsverwaltung für Stadtentwicklung und Umwelt, 2007). The Renewal 
Area “Teutoburger Platz” was deregulated at the end of our observation period (August 2012). The data for 
the areas “Komponistenviertel” and “Niederschöneweide” are from 2010.  
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Tab A2. Descriptive statistics: Matched control group IV 
Balancing of the covariates           
Variable Sample Mean Control standardized % reduction   
  Treated  bias (%) in abs. bias 
Age Unmatched 100.81 59.704 136.9  
 Matched 101.5 92.186 31 77.3 
East / west Unmatched 0.04238 0.64936 -165.7  
 Matched 0.04264 0.07909 -10 94 
Longitude Unmatched 27282 23782 55.4  
 Matched 27271 28781 -23.9 56.8 
Latitude Unmatched 21874 19423 43.9  
 Matched 21900 21080 14.7 66.5 
Index of locational quality Unmatched 2.5171 3.7574 -61.4  
[1, poor to 6, very good] Matched 2.7627 3.1517 -19.2 68.6 
Typical floor space index Unmatched 2.2635 1.0455 163.9  
 Matched 2.263 1.7998 62.3 62 
Land use: residential Unmatched 0.86687 0.84722 5.6  
 Matched 0.9545 0.90186 15 -167.9 
Land use: commercial Unmatched 0.02761 0.01855 6  
 Matched 0.02978 0.06051 -20.5 -239.1 
Distance to CBD [m] Unmatched 4705.4 9250.6 -120.3  
 Matched 4697 6698.9 -53 56 
Distance to park [m] Unmatched 2138.2 1695.4 39  
 Matched 2132.2 1801.8 29.1 25.4 
Distance to main street  Unmatched 127.43 198.62 -40.4  
[m] Matched 127.63 125.6 1.2 97.1 
Distance to water [m] Unmatched 1406.7 1594.7 -16.6  
  Matched 1399.3 1192.6 18.3 -10 
Notes: The propensity scores are computed using nearest neighbor matching. Following Rosenbaum & Rubin 
(1985) and Leuven & Sianesi (2003), the standardized bias is the difference between the sample means in 
the subsamples (treated and control), computed as the percentage of the square root of the average of the 
sample variances in the treated and control groups. Imposing a common support restriction does not sub-
stantially change the results of the later analyses where we use the matched observations as a control 
group  
Tab A3. Descriptive statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Price [constant 2012 €] 1,495,060 5,356,786 16,631 299,000,000 
Plot area [m²] 1682.062 6086.808 150 205222 
Floor space index [floor space/plot area] 1915.712 6105.441 65 191375 
Age [years] 65.51245 37.42346 0 294 
West / east indicator 0.6099851 0.4877562 0 1 
Residential area indicator 0.8415044 0.3652073 0 1 
Commercial area indicator 0.0287225 0.1670266 0 1 
industrial area indicator 0.0323323 0.1768823 0 1 
Distance to main street [m] 182.3591 207.0289 0 2140.739 
Distance to public rail transport  [m] 980.7227 988.5591 10.0361 9381.628 
Distance to open water [m] 1515.542 1297.361 0 8316.602 
Distance to park [m] 1786.17 1377.644 0 5972.606 
Distance to playground [m] 325.5659 318.355 10.34 6209.051 
Distance to listed building [m] 230.9044 270.7093 0.2341669 2829.887 
Street noise level [db] 57.42288 9.529247 15.0819 94.5513 
Location within block     
Building at street front [%] 73.34    
Building at a corner [%] 13.98    
Building with multiple fronts [%] 3.89    
Hammer type building [%] 1.41    
Building in inner block loc. [%] 6.66    
Other [%] 4.61    
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Tab A4. Policy effects on property prices: Complete results 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Control group 0.5 km -
 ∞ buff-
er(I) 
0.5 - 2 km 
buffer 
(II) 
Investiga-
tion areas 
(III) 
Investiga-
tion areas 
(III) 
Matched 
observa-
tions (IV) 
Investiga-
tion areas  
(III) 
Matched 
observa-
tions (IV) 
T x POST  (𝛽0) -0.162*** -0.114*** -0.040 -0.032 -0.140*** -0.073 -0.027 
 (0.036) (0.037) (0.040) (0.050) (0.053) (0.048) (0.061) 
T x V (𝛽1) 0.048*** 0.039*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.025*** 0.004 0.006 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
Building age (10 years) -0.144*** -0.122*** -0.129*** -0.168*** -0.113*** -0.122*** -0.106*** 
 (0.006) (0.015) (0.018) (0.024) (0.024) (0.018) (0.025) 
Building age (10 years), 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000** 
Squared (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Industrial 0.127* -0.115 0.190 0.177 0.252 0.251 0.408* 
area indicator (0.072) (0.106) (0.206) (0.395) (0.222) (0.214) (0.244) 
Residential 0.022 -0.084 -0.038 -0.085 0.031 0.027 0.162 
area indicator (0.048) (0.079) (0.129) (0.209) (0.148) (0.133) (0.160) 
Commercial 0.358*** 0.222** 0.212 0.154 0.333* 0.217 0.427** 
use indicator (0.061) (0.090) (0.159) (0.235) (0.173) (0.164) (0.185) 
Plot area (100 sqm) 0.002** 0.003 0.000 -0.000 0.011** -0.001 0.011* 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) 
Floor space (100 sqm) 0.009*** 0.014*** 0.023*** 0.018*** 0.011** 0.023*** 0.011** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) 
Building at a 0.207*** 0.233*** 0.201* 0.268 0.318*** 0.204** 0.308*** 
Corner (0.041) (0.066) (0.106) (0.205) (0.105) (0.103) (0.103) 
Build. with 0.346*** 0.112 0.185 0.351 0.070 0.211 0.088 
mult. fronts (0.065) (0.102) (0.166) (0.245) (0.162) (0.160) (0.159) 
Hammer type -0.108** -0.209 0.064 0.337 -0.448 0.126 -0.445 
Building (0.043) (0.133) (0.236) (0.428) (0.338) (0.280) (0.311) 
Build. in inner -0.133*** -0.270*** -0.398*** -0.588** -0.421*** -0.479*** -0.472*** 
block loc. (0.042) (0.085) (0.153) (0.281) (0.146) (0.151) (0.147) 
T (ever designated) YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
T x A (released from program) YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Hedonic controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Location controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Block x area fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Time-varying effects - - - - - YES YES 
Weighted - - - YES - - - 
Observations 64,677 17,447 7,841 7,841 8,860 7,841 8,860 
R2 0.536 0.502 0.267 0.304 0.324 0.321 0.371 
AIC 23573.1 1236.1 491.7 459.8 972.3 448.1 881.1 
Notes: Expanded version of Table 4 in the main paper. Dependent variable is log of property price in all models. 
Estimation method is (weighted) OLS. T is a 0,1 dummy variable denoting a property location within a re-
newal area. POST similarly denotes that the respective renewal area has been designated. A similarly de-
notes whether the nearest area has been released from the program. V is the number of years that have gone 
by since designation. The cumulated effect after 20 years is the combination of the short-run level shift and 
the long-run effect: exp(𝛽0 + 𝛽1 × 20) − 1. Hedonic and location controls consist of covariates controlling for 
internal property and external location characteristics described in greater detail in the data section and the 
appendix. Block x area fixed effects are statistical block x renewal area x investigation area fixed effects. 
Time-varying controls are sets of interaction effects of year effects and distance to the CBD, district effects 
and a consumption amenity measure described in the data section. Weighted model is weighted by the dis-
tance from the designation cut-off along a latent deprivation variable (Gaussian kernel, bandwidth accord-
ing to Silverman-rule). Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on Block x area fixed effects in all mod-
els. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.  
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Tab A5. Correlations between collected and archived data 
Data available for all invest. areas  Data from Berlin Archive Correlation 
No. green areas per km2 Endowment index green areas 0.503*** 
No. schools/playgrounds per km2 Endowment index schools / playgrounds 0.561*** 
Distance to public transport Endowment index public transport -0.588*** 
Share oven heating Share oven heating 0.685*** 
Share without restroom Share without restroom -0.340 
Share with WC outside Share with WC outside 0.0720 
Average floor space index Average floorspace index 0.684*** 
Share aged 15-45 Share aged 15-45 0.177 
Notes: The correlations are calculated for the subset of the investigation areas, which are described in the records 
available from the Berlin Stata Archive. This includes data for 33 of the 44 investigation areas. The endow-
ment index is a 4 scale index ranging from 1=very bad to 4=very good. 
Tab A6. Policy effects on propensity of buildings being in poor and good condition: Varying 
kernel weights 
  
Control group 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Propensity: 
Poor 
Propensity: 
Poor 
Propensity: 
Poor 
Propensity: 
Good 
Propensity: 
Good 
Propensi-
ty: Good 
Investigation 
areas  
(III) 
Investiga-
tion areas 
(III) 
Investiga-
tion areas 
(III) 
Investigation 
areas  
(III) 
Investiga-
tion areas 
(III) 
Investiga-
tion areas 
(III) 
T x POST (𝛽0) -0.025 0.002 -0.005 0.013 -0.024 0.015 
 (0.062) (0.041) (0.068) (0.022) (0.016) (0.024) 
T x V (𝛽1) -0.010** -0.011*** -0.011* 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 
 (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
Cumulated effect after 20 years 
(%) 
-44.97** -42.65*** -42.32* 94.29*** 86.49*** 104.81*** 
 (18.90) (12.22) (21.71) (27.36) (20.79) (31.20) 
Compound annual growth rate (%)  -2.94 -2.74 -2.71 3.38 3.17 3.65 
T (ever designated) YES YES YES YES YES YES 
T x A (released from program) YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Hedonic controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Location controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Block x area fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Weights Gaussian Gaussian Binary Gaussian Gaussian Binary 
Bandwidth Optimal x 0.5 Optimal x 2 0.05 Optimal x 0.5 Optimal x 2 0.05 
Observations 7,420 7,841 2,034 7,420 7,841 2,034 
R² 0.266 0.284 0.258 0.330 0.290 0.340 
AIC 8281.3 8326.4 2392.4 -249.9 735.4 -70.5 
Notes: Dependent variable is a 0,1 dummy variable that is one if at the time of transaction a property was in poor 
(1–3) or good (4–6) physical condition and zero otherwise. Estimation method is weighted OLS. T is a 0,1 
dummy variable denoting a property location within a renewal area. POST similarly denotes that the respec-
tive renewal area has been designated. A similarly denotes whether the nearest area has been released from 
the program. V is the number of years that have gone by since designation. The cumulated effect after 20 
years is the combination of the short-run level shift and the long-run effect: exp(𝛽0 + 𝛽1 × 20) − 1. Hedonic 
and location controls consist of covariates controlling for internal property and external location character-
istics described in greater detail in the data section and the appendix. Time-varying controls are sets of in-
teraction effects of year effects and distance to the CBD, district effects, and a consumption amenity measure 
described in the data section. Block x area fixed effects are statistical block x renewal area x investigation 
area fixed effects. Gaussian weighted models are weighted by the distance from the designation cut-off along 
a latent deprivation variable. Optimal bandwidth selected according to the Silverman-rule. In binary 
weighted models weights are zero if the designation propensity is within the bandwidth of the cut-off value 
(0.5). Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on block x area effects level in all models. * p < 0.1, ** p < 
0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Tab A7. Policy effects on property transaction prices: Varying kernel weights 
  
Control group 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Investigation 
areas  
(III) 
Investiga-
tion areas 
(III) 
Investiga-
tion areas 
(III) 
Investigation 
areas  
(III) 
Investiga-
tion areas 
(III) 
Investiga-
tion areas 
(III) 
T x POST (𝛽0) -0.035 -0.032 -0.047 -0.058 -0.028 -0.019 
 (0.057) (0.050) (0.045) (0.064) (0.054) (0.050) 
T x V (𝛽1) 0.019*** 0.022*** 0.021*** 0.018*** 0.022*** 0.020*** 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) 
Cumulated effect after 20 years 
(%) 
40.22*** 50.82*** 45.59*** 34.93*** 50.28*** 46.50*** 
 (10.09) (9.21) (8.74) (11.62) (10.87) (10.29) 
Compound annual growth rate (%)  1.70 2.08 1.90 1.51 2.06 1.93 
T (ever designated) YES YES YES YES YES YES 
T x A (released from program) YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Hedonic controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Location controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Block x area fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Weights Gaussian Gaussian Gaussian Binary Binary Binary 
Bandwidth Optimal x 0.5 Optimal Optimal x 2 .05 .1 .2 
Observations 7,420 7,841 7,841 2,034 2,787 4,775 
R² 0.642 0.635 0.630 0.656 0.640 0.635 
AIC 9152.0 10895.7 11403.7 2478.1 3547.4 7127.0 
Notes:  Dependent variable is log of property price in all models. Estimation method is (weighted) OLS. T is a 0,1 
dummy variable denoting a property location within a renewal area. POST similarly denotes that the respec-
tive renewal area has been designated. A similarly denotes whether the nearest area has been released from 
the program. V is the number of years that have gone by since designation. The cumulated effect after 20 
years is the combination of the short-run level shift and the long-run effect: exp(𝛽0 + 𝛽1 × 20) − 1. Hedonic 
and location controls consist of covariates controlling for internal property and external location character-
istics described in greater detail in the data section and the appendix. Time-varying controls are sets of in-
teraction effects of year effects and distance to the CBD, district effects and a consumption amenity measure 
described in the data section. Block x area fixed effects are statistical block x renewal area x investigation 
area fixed effects. Gaussian weighted models are weighted by the distance from the designation cut-off along 
a latent deprivation variable. Optimal bandwidth selected according to the Silverman-rule. In binary 
weighted models weights are zero if the designation propensity is within the bandwidth of the cut-off value 
(0.5). Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on block x area effects in all models. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, 
*** p < 0.01.  
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Tab A8. Policy effects on number of transactions 
  
Control group 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
All  
 
(I) 
1.5- 2 km 
buffer 
 (II) 
Investiga-
tion areas 
(III) 
Matched 
observa-
tions (IV) 
Investiga-
tion areas  
(III) 
Matched 
observa-
tions (IV) 
T x POST (𝛽0) 0.121
*** 0.119*** 0.084* -0.005 -0.139** -0.130 
 (0.040) (0.043) (0.050) (0.068) (0.068) (0.085) 
T x V (𝛽1) -0.025
*** -0.023*** -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.003 -0.007* 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
Cumulated effect after 20 years (%) -31.4*** -28,8*** -20.2*** -25.7*** -18.71** -24.0** 
 (4.9) (5.4) (6.31) (8.60) (8.45) (11.2) 
Compound annual growth rate (%)  -1.90 -1.7 -1.11% -1.47 -1.03 -1.36 
T (ever designated) YES YES YES YES YES YES 
T x A (released from program) YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Hedonic controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Location controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Block x area fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Time-varying effects - - - -- YES YES 
Observations 45,600 10,781 4,527 5,180 4,527 5,180 
R² 0.333 0.341 0.278 0.363 0.356 0.416 
AIC 31,922.1 10,185.1 5,175.2 4,500.1 5,195.4 4,572.9 
Notes: Dependent variable is log of number of transactions within a block-year cell in all models. Estimation meth-
od is OLS. T is a 0,1 dummy variable denoting a property location within a renewal area. POST similarly de-
notes that the respective renewal area has been designated. A similarly denotes whether the nearest area 
has been released from the program. V is the number of years that have gone by since designation. The cu-
mulated effect after 20 years is the combination of the short-run level shift and the long-run effect: 
exp(𝛽0 + 𝛽1 × 20) − 1. Hedonic and location controls consist of covariates controlling for internal property 
and external location characteristics described in greater detail in the data section and the appendix. Block x 
area fixed effects are statistical block x renewal area x investigation area fixed effects. Time-varying controls 
are sets of interaction effects of year effects and distance to the CBD, district effects, and a consumption 
amenity measure described in the data section. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on Block x area 
fixed effects level in all models. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Tab A9. Policy effects on standard land values 
  
Control group 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
All  
 
(I) 
1.5- 2 km 
buffer 
 (II) 
Investiga-
tion areas 
(III) 
Matched 
observations 
(IV) 
Investigation 
areas  
(III) 
Matched 
observations 
(IV) 
T x POST (𝛽0) 0.528
*** 0.364*** 0.190*** 0.0311 0.00564 0.0545** 
 (0.0284) (0.0287) (0.0346) (0.0351) (0.0189) (0.0228) 
T x V (𝛽1) 0.00207 0.0104
*** 0.0128*** 0.00607*** -0.00353** -0.00652*** 
 (0.00142) (0.00163) (0.00198) (0.00194) (0.00141) (0.00178) 
Cumulated effect after 20 years (%) 76.78*** 77.09*** 56.4*** 16.47*** -6.3** -7.31 
 (4.47) (4.62) (5.92) (5.84) (2.97) (4.54) 
Compound annual growth rate (%) 2.89 2.90 2.26 0.77 -0.32 -0.38 
T (ever designated) YES YES YES YES YES YES 
T x A (released from program) YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Hedonic controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Location controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Block x area fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Time-varying effects - - - - YES YES 
Observations 63,975 17,301 7,831 8,853 7,831 8,853 
R² 0.948 0.917 0.866 0.937 0.952 0.963 
AIC -58,763.9 -8,231.9 -3,327.8 -7,186.7 -10,753.7 -11,446.6 
Notes: Dependent variable is log of assessed land value in all models. Estimation method is OLS. T is a 0,1 dummy 
variable denoting a property location within a renewal area. POST similarly denotes that the respective re-
newal area has been designated. A similarly denotes whether the nearest area has been released from the 
program. V is the number of years that have gone by since designation. The cumulated effect after 20 years 
is the combination of the short-run level shift and the long-run effect: exp(𝛽0 + 𝛽1 × 20) − 1. Hedonic and 
location controls consist of covariates controlling for internal property and external location characteristics 
described in greater detail in the data section and the appendix. Block x area fixed effects are statistical 
block x renewal area x investigation area fixed effects. Time-varying controls are sets of interaction effects 
of year effects and distance to the CBD, district effects and a consumption amenity measure described in the 
data section. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on block x area fixed effects in all models. * p < 
0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0. 
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Tab A10.Policy effects on property prices: Pre-trend evaluation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent variable Condition poor Condition good Log of price 
  
Control group 
Invest. areas 
(III) 
Invest. areas 
(III) 
Invest. areas 
(III) 
Invest. areas 
(III) 
Invest. areas 
(III) 
Invest. areas 
(III) 
T x POST -0.029 0.023 -0.022 0.003 -0.052 -0.053 
 (0.050) (0.067) (0.015) (0.015) (0.056) (0.068) 
T x V -0.012*** -0.009** 0.007*** 0.003 0.022*** 0.004 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) 
T x V_PRE 0.021 0.019 -0.005 -0.017** 0.007 -0.013 
 (0.022) (0.026) (0.007) (0.008) (0.026) (0.031) 
Cumulated effect after 20 years (%) -24.26*** -13.76 12.76*** 5.54 46.85*** 3.54 
 (7.19) (9.80) (3.63) (4.23) (9.54) (10.04) 
Compound annual growth rate (%) -1.38 -0.74 0.60 0.27 1.94 0.17 
T (ever designated) YES YES YES YES YES YES 
T x A (released from program) YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Hedonic controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Location controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Block x area fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Time-varying effects - - - - - YES 
Observations 7,841 7,841 7,841 7,841 7,841 7,841 
R² 0.300 0.351 0.267 0.321 0.635 0.682 
AIC 8,003.6 7,959.4 493.6 450.7 11,275.0 10,746.2 
Notes: Dependent variable is log of property price in all models. Estimation method is OLS. T is a 0,1 dummy varia-
ble denoting a property location within a renewal area. A similarly denotes whether the nearest area has 
been released from the program. POST similarly denotes that the respective renewal area has been desig-
nated. V is the number of years that have gone by since designation. The cumulated effect after 20 years is 
the combination of the short-run level shift and the long-run effect: exp(𝛽0 + 𝛽1 × 20) − 1. Hedonic and loca-
tion controls consist of covariates controlling for internal property and external location characteristics de-
scribed in greater detail in the data sections of the main paper and the appendix. Block x area fixed effects 
are statistical block x renewal area x investigation area fixed effects Time-varying controls are sets of inter-
action effects of year effects and district effects, East Berlin effects and a consumption amenity measure de-
scribed in the data section of the main paper. Except for adding T x V_PRE, columns (1) and (2) are identical 
to columns (3) and (6) of Table 2, columns (3) and (4) identical to columns (3) and (6) of Table 3, and col-
umns (5) and (6) identical to columns (3) and (6) of Table 4. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered 
on block x area fixed effects. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Tab A11.Renewal area effects and the influence of modeling time-varying effects  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  
Control group 
Investi-
gation 
areas  
(III) 
Matched 
observa-
tions (IV) 
Investiga-
tion areas  
(III) 
Matched 
observa-
tions (IV) 
Investiga-
tion areas  
(III) 
Matched 
observa-
tions (IV) 
T x POST  -0.108** -0.085 -0.009 -0.049 -0.069 -0.057 
 (0.048) (0.056) (0.040) (0.053) (0.043) (0.054) 
T x V  0.009** 0.021*** 0.019*** 0.005 0.003 0.001 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) 
Cum. effect after  7.0 40.48*** 43.80*** 5.43 -1.31 -2.85 
20 years (%) (8.72) (12.21) (7.59) (10.13) (7.78) (9.88) 
Av. appr. rate (%) 0.34 1.71 1.83 0.26 -0.07 -0.14 
Observations 7,841 8,860 7,841 8,860 7,841 8,860 
R2 0.678 0.732 0.644 0.718 0.655 0.721 
AIC 10,764.0 13,232.4 11,115.8 13,284.1 10,911.4 13,223.0 
T (ever designated) YES YES YES YES YES YES 
T x A (released from program) YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Hedonic controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Location controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Block x area fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Time-varying effects: 
District x year effects YES YES - - - - 
Consumption amenities x year effects - - YES YES YES YES 
East Berlin x year effects - - - - YES YES 
Notes: Dependent variable is log of property price in all models. Estimation method is OLS. T is a 0,1 dummy varia-
ble denoting a property location within a renewal area. A similarly denotes whether the nearest area has 
been released from the program. POST similarly denotes that the respective renewal area has been desig-
nated. V is the number of years that have gone by since designation. The cumulated effect after 20 years is 
the combination of the short-run level shift and the long-run effect: exp(𝛽0 + 𝛽1 × 20) − 1. Hedonic and loca-
tion controls consist of covariates controlling for internal property and external location characteristics de-
scribed in greater detail in the data sections of the main paper and the appendix. Block x area fixed effects 
are statistical block x renewal area x investigation area fixed effects. Time-varying controls are sets of inter-
action effects of year effects and district effects, East Berlin effects or a consumption amenity measure de-
scribed in the data section of the main paper. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on block x area 
fixed effects in all models. . * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Tab A12. Alternative methods to compute standard errors 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Point 
esti-
mates 
Standard errors 
 Clustered 
(block) 
Clustered 
(traffic 
cells) 
Clustered 
(post 
code) 
Spatial 
HAC 
Spatial 
HAC 
Spatial 
HAC 
Spatial 
HAC 
Distance cutoff     2km 5km 10km 50km 
T x POST  -0.027 (0.061) (0.065) (0.063) (0.040) (0.062) (0.061) (0.064) 
T x V 0.006 (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.003)* (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)* 
Cum. effect (%) 9.36 (11.15) (11.66) (16.44) (9.14) (11.30) (11.44) (10.89) 
Observations 8,860        
R2 0.736        
Notes: Baseline model is model (6) in Table 4 in the main text. T is a 0,1 dummy variable denoting a property loca-
tion within a renewal area. POST similarly denotes that the respective renewal area has been designated. V 
is the number of years that have gone by since designation. The cumulated effect after 20 years is the com-
bination of the short-run level shift and the long-run effect: exp(𝛽0 + 𝛽1 × 20) − 1. All models include he-
donic and location controls, block x area fixed effects, a target area indicator, after-designation effects, year 
effects, and time-varying effects as described, for example, in the data section of the main paper. Spatial HAC 
denotes non-parametric heteroscedasticity-autocorrelation consistent standard errors accounting for spa-
tial autocorrelation and serial correlation allowing for a lag length of 23 years (our observation period). 
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Tab A13.Placebo designation effects on investigation areas: 
Renewal and investigation areas vs. matched control group 
  
Control group 
(1)  (2)  
Matched observations (IV) 
Treatment effect on renewal areas:    
TREN x POSTREN (within renewal) -0.036 (0.046) -0.116** (0.063) 
TREN x VREN (years since designation) 0.021*** (0.005) 0.009** (0.004) 
Cum. effect after 20 years (%) 46.21*** (8.07) 7.01* (7.49) 
Av. appr. rate (%) 1.92  0.34  
Placebo treatment effect on investigation 
areas:  
 
 
 
TINV x POSTINV (within investigation) -0.078* (0.047) 0.035 (0.050) 
TINV x VINV) (years since designation) 0.007* (0.004) 0.002 (0.004) 
Cum. effect after 20 years (%) 7.01 (8.33) 7.33 (9.06) 
Av. appr. rate (%) 0.34  0.35  
Observations 12,121  12,121  
R² 0.700  0.725  
AIC 17,754.0  17,332.9  
T (ever designated) YES  YES  
T x A (released from program) YES  YES  
Hedonic controls YES  YES  
Location controls YES  YES  
Block x area effects YES  YES  
Year effects YES  YES  
Time-varying effects -  YES  
Notes: Dependent variable is log of property price in all models. Estimation method is OLS. T is a 0,1 dummy varia-
ble denoting a property location within a treatment area. A similarly denotes whether the nearest area has 
been released from the program.  POST similarly denotes that the respective treatment area has been desig-
nated. V is the number of years that have gone by since designation. The cumulated effect after 20 years is 
the combination of the short-run level shift and the long-run effect: exp(𝛽0 + 𝛽1 × 20) − 1. Location controls 
consist of covariates controlling for external location characteristics described in greater detail in the data 
sections of the main paper and the appendix. Block x area fixed effects are statistical block x renewal area x 
investigation area fixed effects. Time-varying controls are sets of interaction effects of year effects and dis-
tance to the CBD, district effects, and a consumption amenity measure described in the data section of the 
main paper. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on block x area fixed effects. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, 
*** p < 0.01 
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Tab A14. Renewal area effects with historic amenities  
 (1) (2) 
 Control group Investigation areas (III) Matched observations (IV) 
T x POST -0.065 -0.016 
 (0.048) (0.062) 
T x V  0.004 0.006 
 (0.004) (0.005) 
Cum. effect after 20 years (%) 1.94 10.13 
 (8.14) (10.76) 
Av. appr. rate (%) 0.10 0.48 
Observations 7,841 8,860 
R² 0.681 0.736 
AIC 10,757.2 13,192.2 
T (ever designated) YES YES 
T x A (released from program) YES YES 
Hedonic controls YES YES 
Location controls YES YES 
Block x area effects YES YES 
Year effects YES YES 
Time-varying effects YES YES 
Notes: Dependent variable is log of property price in all models. Estimation method is OLS. T is a 0,1 dummy varia-
ble denoting a property location within a renewal area. POST similarly denotes that the respective renewal 
area has been designated. A similarly denotes whether the nearest area has been released from the program. 
V is the number of years that have gone by since designation. The cumulated effect after 20 years is the 
combination of the short-run level shift and the long-run effect: exp(𝛽0 + 𝛽1 × 20) − 1. Hedonic and location 
controls consist of covariates controlling for internal property and external location characteristics de-
scribed in greater detail in the data section and the appendix. Block x area fixed effects are statistical block x 
renewal area x investigation area fixed effects. Time-varying controls are sets of interaction effects of year 
effects and distance to the CBD, district effects, and a consumption amenity measure described in the data 
section. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on block x area fixed effects in all models. * p < 0.1, ** 
p < 0.05, *** p < 0. 
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Tab A15. Varying groups of treated and controls – including time-varying effects  
No of areas Cumulated effect after 20 years % within 2 S.E. length 
of bench. Treat. Control Iterations Mean S.D. Min Max 
Varying number of treated areas 
1 22 22 0.04 0.48 -1.00 0.98 36.36% 
2 22 462 0.02 0.30 -0.91 0.64 52.81% 
5 22 2500 0.05 0.18 -0.62 0.53 80.00% 
10 22 2500 0.07 0.11 -0.30 0.42 96.44% 
15 22 2500 0.08 0.08 -0.16 0.30 99.80% 
20 22 2500 0.09 0.08 -0.18 0.30 99.64% 
Varying number of control areas 
22 1 22 -0.12 0.34 -0.67 0.69 31.82% 
22 2 462 -0.07 0.30 -0.78 0.69 53.68% 
22 5 2500 -0.01 0.17 -0.79 0.74 76.56% 
22 10 2500 0.01 0.09 -0.38 0.31 92.44% 
22 15 2500 0.02 0.05 -0.16 0.17 99.08% 
22 20 2500 0.02 0.05 -0.22 0.18 99.32% 
Varying number of treated and control areas 
1 1 2261 44.3 449 -1242 10063 0.97% 
2 2 2500 7.14 131 -1054 3407 8.72% 
5 5 2500 0.40 3.61 -22.56 85.65 42.56% 
10 10 2500 0.10 0.16 -0.58 0.72 84.48% 
15 15 2500 0.06 0.08 -0.39 0.38 98.08% 
20 20 2500 0.07 0.08 -0.31 0.36 98.48% 
Notes: Each row describes the distribution of the cumulated effects after 20 years derived from a series of estima-
tions of the benchmark specification (equations 1 + 2). The effects are expressed in units of log-differences. 
We consider all possible combinations of one or two treated vs. all (22) control areas and vice versa. For all 
other combinations we use 2,500 randomly drawn selections. 
Tab A16. Descriptive statistics of matched control group A-IV   
Balancing of the covariates           
Variable Sample Mean Control standardized % reduction   
  Treated  bias (%) in abs. bias 
Age Unmatched 87.676 56.839 90.2  
 Matched 88.573 80.826 22.7 74.9 
Index of locational quality Unmatched 2.7652 3.8524 -51.8  
[1, poor to 5, very good] Matched 2.9681 3.4993 -25.3 51.1 
Typical floor space index Unmatched 2.1696 0.9391 149.7  
 Matched 2.1696 2.0385 16 89.3 
Residential area indicator Unmatched 0.8112 0.8462 -9.3  
 Matched 0.8971 0.8568 10.7 -15.3 
Commercial area indicator Unmatched 0.0393 0.0219 10.1  
 Matched 0.0430 0.0674 -14.2 -40.2 
Distance to CBD [m] Unmatched 5006.4 9667.8 -121.5  
 Matched 4980.7 5402.4 -11 91 
Distance to park [m] Unmatched 2302.5 1595.4 55.4  
 Matched 2293.1 1973 25.1 54.7 
Distance to main street [m] Unmatched 125.19 208.07 -45.2  
 Matched 125.12 115.84 5.1 88.8 
Distance to water [m] Unmatched 1245.7 1626.5 -32.4  
  Matched 1245.9 1200.5 3.9 88.1 
Notes: The propensity scores are computed using nearest neighbor matching. Following Rosenbaum and Rubin 
(1985) and Leuven and Sianesi (2003), the standardized bias is the difference in the sample means in the 
subsamples (treated and control) as the percentage of the square root of the average of the sample vari-
ances in the treated and control groups. Imposing a common support restriction does not substantially 
change the results of the later analyses where we use the matched observations as a control group 
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Tab A17. Renewal area treatment effects – buildings in good quality 
  
Control group 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
All (I) 0.5-2 km (II) Investigation areas 
(III) 
Matched observations 
(IV) 
T x POST 0.010 -0.067 -2.148*** 0.512 
 (0.338) (0.416) (0.402) (1.226) 
T x V  -0.000 -0.002 -0.026 -0.002 
 (0.012) (0.014) (0.020) (0.019) 
Cum. effect after 20 years (%) 0.57 -10.0 -93.1 60.81 
 (39.47) (50.26) (75.7) (243.58) 
Av. appr. rate (%) 0.03 -0.53 -12.5 2.40 
Observations 15,406 2,567 725 948 
R² 0.917 0.941 0.863 0.891 
AIC 5,488.1 1,474.4 502.8 736.3 
T (ever designated) YES YES YES YES 
T x A (released from program) YES YES YES YES 
Hedonic controls YES YES YES YES 
Location Controls YES YES YES YES 
Block x area effects YES YES YES YES 
Year effects YES YES YES YES 
Notes: Dependent variable is log of property price in all models. Estimation method is OLS. T is a 0,1 dummy varia-
ble denoting a property location within a renewal area AND in good condition. POST similarly denotes that 
the respective renewal area has been designated. A similarly denotes whether the nearest area has been re-
leased from the program. V is the number of years that have gone by since designation. The cumulated effect 
after 20 years is the combination of the short-run level shift and the long-run effect: exp(𝛽0 + 𝛽1 × 20) − 1. 
Hedonic and location controls consist of covariates controlling for internal property and external location 
characteristics described in greater detail in the data section and the appendix. Block x area fixed effects are 
statistical block x renewal area x investigation area fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses are clus-
tered on Block x area fixed effects in all models. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0. 
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Tab A18.Renewal area spillover effects within 500m renewal area buffer 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Control group 
All 
 (A-I) 
1.5-2 km 
renewal 
area buffer  
(A-II) 
Invest. areas 
+ 1 km buff-
er (A-III) 
Matched ob-
servations (A-
IV) 
Invest. areas 
+ 1 km buff-
er  (A-III) 
Matched 
observa-
tions  
(A-IV) 
T x POST -0.201*** -0.133*** -0.075** -0.004 0.030 0.014 
 (0.035) (0.036) (0.034) (0.042) (0.033) (0.053) 
T x V 0.032*** 0.022*** 0.009*** 0.019*** -0.007*** -0.002 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
Cum. effect after  55.12*** 35.31*** 11.64** 46.22*** -11.04** -0.297 
20 years (%) (5.27) (5.43) (5.35) (6.53) (4.75) (8.03) 
Av. appr. rate (%) 2.21 1.53 0.66 1.93 -0.62 -0.13 
Observations 66,651 19,421 21,324 12,641 21,324 12,641 
R² 0.805 0.777 0.723 0.753 0.749 0.781 
AIC 82,305.6 27,744.8 31,296.4 15,989.7 29,864.8 15,243.6 
Hedonic controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Location controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Block x area effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Time-varying effects - - - - YES YES 
Notes: Dependent variable is log of property price in all models. Estimation method is OLS. T is a 0,1 dummy varia-
ble denoting a property location within a spillover area. A similarly denotes whether the nearest renewal 
area has been released from the program. POST similarly denotes that the respective renewal area has been 
designated. V is the number of years that have gone by since designation. The cumulated effect after 20 
years is the combination of the short-run level shift and the long-run effect: exp(𝛽0 + 𝛽1 × 20) − 1. Hedonic 
and location controls consist of covariates controlling for internal property and external location character-
istics described in greater detail in the data sections of the main paper and the appendix. Time-varying con-
trols are sets of interaction effects of year effects and distance to the CBD, district effects, and a consumption 
amenity measure described in the data section of the main paper. Standard errors in parentheses clustered 
on block x area effects. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
